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Introduction
Imagine you had a device that combined a telephone, a TV, a
camcorder, and a personal computer. No matter where you went or
what time it was, your child could see you and talk to you, you could
watch a replay of your team's last game, you could browse the latest
additions to the library, . . . [you] could live in many places without
foregoing opportunities for useful and fulfilling employment, by
"telecommuting" to your office through an electronic highway in-
stead of by automobile, bus or train;... [or you] could obtain gov-
ernment information directly or through local organizations like
libraries, apply for and receive government benefits electronically,
and get in touch with government officials easily.. .. "
The excerpt above suggests some of the potential uses of the com-
ing Information Superhighway, officially called the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure (NII). The NII-a symbol of the information
revolution-has the potential to change everyday life dramatically in
the next century. This novel domain, with its emphasis on communi-
cation, will surely present new questions of law, particularly in the
area of constitutional law related to freedom of speech.
Because the NII exists today only in the imagination, its precise
landscape is uncertain and its full scope is impossible to describe. This
Article suggests a thoughtful way to apply one First Amendment doc-
trine-the public forum doctrine-within this new world. Rather than
drawing an analogy to a traditional public forum, like a park,2 or to a
nonpublic forum, like an airport terminal,3 this Article argues that the
NII should be conceptualized on a broader scale as an entity, like a
city, that includes an abundance of both public forums and nonpublic
forums. This Article suggests an analytical framework for identifying
the public forums on the NII and outlines their constitutional
significance.
Part I describes the possibilities for the NII in more detail, includ-
ing potential uses, problems, and constitutional issues. Part I also pro-
vides a few concrete examples that are referenced throughout the
Article, including a political conference, a "Cronies" conference, and
a health care conference.4 Part II follows the approach of several
1. INFORMATION INFRASTRucruRE TASK FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION IN-
FRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION 5, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993) [hereinafter INFOR-
MATION INFRAsTRucruRE TASK FORCE] (emphasis added).
2. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
3. See International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992).
4. See infra Part I().
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commentators5 by applying the public forum doctrine to the networks
that will compose the NII. Like those commentators, this Article con-
cludes that the public forum doctrine is not well suited to networks.6
Part III employs a more nuanced approach in analyzing the NII.
Rather than trying to analogize the network to either a traditional
public forum or a nonpublic forum, Part III views the NII within a
more expansive setting in which both public forums and nonpublic
forums can coexist. Considering the theoretical justifications for the
special position of the public forum, Part III attempts to locate the
landmarks on the Information Superhighway that might be appropri-
ate for public forum analysis. A variety of differing justifications for
the public forum doctrine are discussed at length in this regard, in-
cluding Professor Richard Saphire's emphasis on formal values, 7 Pro-
fessor Robert Post's distinction between governance and
management, 8 and Professor Curtis Berger's articulation of the func-
tional attributes of a public forum.9 These viewpoints are supple-
mented by novel perspectives from moder First Amendment theory,
such as Dean Daniel Farber's exploration of public choice 10 and
David Yassky's application of Professor Bruce Ackerman's "dualist
democracy" theory.1'
One proposal is to focus on nonprofit, government-owned elec-
tronic forums that have unrestricted access to message recipients and
viewpoint-neutral access to a reasonably large number of message
senders.1 2 This proposal finds support in all of the theoretical analyses
discussed. 13 In fact, to the extent that those analyses respond differ-
ently to the notion of locating public forums on the NII, they can be
organized along lines suggested by Professor Louis Seidman's descrip-
tion of the dilemmas of modern constitutional debate.' 4 Finally, Part
III discusses the possible constitutional relevance of those NII
5. Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap,
35 B.C. L. REv. 1067, 1095-98 (1994); Edward J. Naughton, Note, Is Cyberspace a Public
Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEo. L.J. 409, 428-35
(1992); Michael L. Taviss, Editorial Comment, Dueling Forums: The Public Forum Doc-
trine's Failure to Protect the Electronic Forum, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 757, 781-88 (1992).
6. See infra Part II(C); see e.g., Lively, supra note 5, at 1095-97 (describing barriers to
understandings of interactive media as a public forum).
7. See infra Part III(A)(1).
8. See infra Part III(A)(2).
9. See infra Part III(A)(3).
10. See infra Part III(A)(4).
11. See infra Part III(A)(5).
12. See infra Part III(C)(1).
13. See infra notes 262-268. See also infra Part III(B)(1) and (2).
14. See infra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
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landmarks by focusing on four issues that will surely be raised: topic
dedication, forum membership, forum costs, and forum closure.' 5
The full scope of the NiI is impossible to foretell, and an attempt
to undertake a conclusive constitutional analysis at this point would
be premature. Yet, given the potential impact of the Nil on society,
constitutional protection will be critical from its inception. 16 The
scope of the protection to be granted to Ni participants presents a
particular challenge given the judicial tendency to rely upon tradition
in constitutional interpretation. By offering thoughtful suggestions for
the direction of future discussions, this Article begins the analysis, but
does not complete it.
I. The Developing Information Superhighway: Potential for
Societal Transformation and Complex
Constitutional Issues
Recognizing the emergence of the computer network as a power-
ful medium for expression, commentators have considered whether
private expression on such networks is protected by the First Amend-
ment and, in particular, by the public forum doctrine. 17 With the de-
velopment of the Nil, those analyses must be reexamined in light of
the new circumstances. This Part of the Article explores some of the
First Amendment values implicated by the development of the NII
and sketches both general possibilities for and specific examples of
network regulation that might impair those values.
A. The Electronic Village Will Generate a Variety of Speech Protected
by the First Amendment
The Nil has received a tremendous amount of coverage in the
media recently.'8 Much of the enthusiasm focuses on the improve-
15. See infra Part IU(C)(2).
16. See Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy
Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1026
(1987):
Precisely because government intervention must keep a universalist orientation,
some limit on that intervention is necessary.... [P]ervasive, universalist govern-
ment intervention would allow no space for particularist choice. Thus, the ideal
of a "public" government necessarily entails its opposite: a "private" sphere, pro-
tected from public intervention, within which people are free to form individual-
ized relationships that cannot be justified under the requirements of impersonal
beneficence.
17. See Naughton, supra note 5; Taviss, supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Even in Cyberspace, Overcrowding, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 2,
1994, at D1 [hereinafter Lewis, Cyberspace, Overcrowding]:
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ments that enhanced networks can bring to everyday life.19 Perhaps
the most easily understood benefit of the NII is its ability to overcome
many of the limitations of distance. For example, although a person
may not be able to visit a site, she may be able to exploit the tremen-
dous information-gathering power of a computer at that site.20
Many businesses are already exploiting this technology.2 First,
networking can facilitate human interactions for group projects and
can be critical for people to "cut across conventional organizational
boundaries of geography and work unit. '2 2 Second, computer scien-
In the computer-age equivalent of the Gold Rush, thousands of people are sign-
ing up each month for access to the worldwide web of computer networks and
electronic information services-known as cyberspace-where strangers can chat,
mail can be exchanged, groceries can be ordered and home banking can be done,
to name only a few possibilities.
See also David Bollier, The Information Superhighway: Roadmap for Renewed Public Pur-
pose, TIKKUN, July/Aug. 1993, at 20; Robert Wright, The New Democrat from Cyberspace,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 24, 1993, at 18.
19. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, The Computer Always Beeps Twice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1994, at Cl (describing mail as taking five seconds to reach the Galapagos Islands via
computer networks rather than months when sent by paper mail).
20. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 226-31 (1983) (sur-
veying trends in communications technology).
Authors have also considered the beneficial effects of increased computer networks on
a wide range of topics from health care to entertainment that will not be addressed here.
See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
The analyses discussed in this Article have been performed in the absence of the NIl,
with existing computer networks in mind. It seems likely that developments associated
with the NII will at least accelerate the changes that networking already brings.
21. In work patterns, increased use of computer networks might facilitate at least
three kinds of changes: in access to information, interactions with colleagues, and work
locale. All are related to networking's central ability to change the meaning of distances;
information, colleagues, and the effects of one's work can seem closer.
Most lawyers are already aware of the potential for information retrieval over net-
works; LEXIS, through MeadNet@, and Westlaw, through WestNet®, give lawyers the in-
formational facilities of an entire law library at their desks. Other information services,
such as NEXIS® and Dialogue®, abound; they continue to grow and to be accessible
through networks. See William Glaberson, Earthquake Coverage, with Electronic Extras,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at D6 (describing a newspaper available in electronic form in the
aftermath of an earthquake that made newspaper distribution difficult). There may al-
ready be so much information available on networks that development of tools to access
the information efficiently may be critical. See John Markoff, A Free and Simple Computer
Link, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at D1 (describing new software program that helps people
find their way around the Internet as "the first 'killer app' of network computing-an
applications program so different and so obviously useful that it can create a new industry
from scratch"); cf. Mark S. Nadel, Editorial Freedom: Editors, Retailers, and Access to the
Mass Media, 9 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 213, 223-25 (1987) (describing the need for
editors to assist consumers in selecting information).
22. Tom Finholt & Lee S. Sproull, Electronic Groups at Work, 1 ORGANIZATIONAL
SCi. 41, 59 (1990).
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tists have developed special-purpose systems, called "groupware," to
facilitate group work; one commentator notes that "groupware is be-
ing positioned as the distinctive breakthrough product for the next
great industry trend, networking."23 A third work-related benefit of
increased networking is called telecommuting or telework, which en-
ables people to work outside the office over a network.24 The alterna-
tive work site could be the person's home, an office closer to home, or
a temporary location, such as a hotel or a train.25 For employees,
working at home makes juggling work and child care easier, and
working from hotels increases productivity while on trips. For em-
ployers, alternative work sites reduce overhead costs. 26
In addition, the NII will be able to enhance an "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open" 27 debate on public issues by improving our abil-
ity to become informed about public issues and to discuss those issues
actively.28 Direct political action may include using networks to con-
23. Jonathon Allen, Groupware and Social Reality, in SOCIAL ISSUES IN COMPUTING:
PUTrING COMPUTING IN ITS PLACE 38 (Chuck Huff & Thomas Finholt eds., 1994) [herein-
after SOCIAL IssuEs IN CoMPuTrNG]. See also Christine V. Bullen & John L. Bennett,
Groupware in Practice" An Interpretation of Work Experiences, in COMPUTERIZATION AND
CoNTRovERsy: VALUE COLrTcrs Am SOCIAL CHOICES 257 (Charles Dunlop & Rob
Kling eds., 1991).
24. Se4 e.g., Calvin Sims, Quake Provides Glimpse of Future of Commuting, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1994, at A12 (describing people responding to earthquake-related disrup-
tions by working at home and at satellite offices via computers and video conferencing
systems).
25. Robert E. Kraut, Predicting the Use of Technology: The Case of Telework, in So-
CIAL ISSUES IN COMPUTING, supra note 23, at 312, 313.
26. Id. at 324-27. Cf. INFORMATION INFRAsTRuCruRE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3
(suggesting that with development of the NII, "[p]eople could live almost anywhere they
wanted, without foregoing opportunities for useful and fulfilling employment, by 'telecom-
muting' to their offices through an electronic highway").
27. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
28. One important part of speech within the political process is becoming informed
about the issues. As one commentator notes, "In an electronically facilitated 'information
society,' ... provid[ing] wide access to pertinent economic and political information... is
... easier because the new technologies of electronic and computer print and video systems
allow almost anyone living anywhere to have access to and retrieve information." BENJA-
MIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 278
(1984). This commentator calls for a "Civic Videotex Service" that "would offer a stan-
dard, nationwide, interactive and free videotext service that would provide viewers with
regular news, discussions of issues, and technical, political, and economic data." Id. at 279.
Another important part of speech within the political process is discussion of the is-
sues actively. Many commentators see networking as a means of creating "electronic town
meetings," "in which citizens can hear and contribute to the community discussion of is-
sues." F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON, Teledemocracy Reconsidered, in COMPUTERS IN THE
HuMAN CoNrcr 438, 438 (Tom Forester ed., 1989); see John Holusha, Virginia's Elec-
tronic Village, N.Y. TIMiEs, Jan. 16, 1994, § 3, at 9 (describing town network that provided
minutes to town council sessions, various meeting schedules, communication with local
January 1995]
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tact representatives 29 and, more radically, for electronic polling or
electronic voting.30 The NII can also be used as a high-tech educa-
tional tool to inform people on many topics, including the political
debate.31
One characteristic that distinguishes the NII from some existing
networks, such as cable TV networks (as currently implemented), is
government officials, and possibly referendums as a "literal application of the 'electronic
town meeting' concept").
By carrying on debates over a computer network, people can interact despite geo-
graphical barriers and can make use of other computer technologies, such as word proces-
sors, to facilitate their expression and analyses. For example, in many computer
applications, it is common to respond to a complex argument by taking advantage of the
"cut and paste" features of word processors in order to include lengthy quotations from the
argument in the response. See, e.g., DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW
USERS 236 (1994) (noting that "follow-up" articles "may include some or all (preferably
some, only what's necessary) of the article(s) you're following up").
29. RICHARD M. NEUSTADT, Electronic Politics, in THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
REVOLUTION 561, 561 (Tom Forester ed., 1985) (Congressman Jim Coyne). See also
sources cited infra note 51.
30. Id. at 566-68; see ARTERTON, supra note 28, at 440; BARBER, supra note 28, at 289-
90 (noting that home voting would make the process more convenient and more private,
but arguing that voting should be done in public places); Richard L. Berke, 'Hey Prez!':
Computers Offer New Line to Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at Al, A14 (describing
systems available to obtain information including presidential speeches and photos from
the government over computer networks, to give opinions to the government over the
telephone network, and to send computer messages to the White House (a system that
receives hundreds of computer messages a day)). Cf. Lewis, supra note 18, at D6 (describ-
ing one computer network's poll receiving more than 5,000 comments within an hour of
President Clinton's State of the Union address).
31. Cf. Richard D. Parker, "Here, the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist Mani-
festo, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 531, 576 n.76 (1993) ("After a decade or two in which expendi-
ture on our public schools has vastly increased and the capacity of the schools to deliver
the most basic education has collapsed, why don't we see that that presents one of the
fundamental constitutional issues of our time?").
Access to additional information is certainly helpful to the educational process, espe-
cially for sophisticated students able to take advantage of the electronic databases dis-
cussed above. The groupware technology discussed supra note 12 would also be helpful in
an educational context.
Moreover, specialized long-distance learning projects have been developed and are
now commonplace. See, e.g., Isabelle Bruder, Redefining Science: Technology and the New
Science Literacy, ELECTRONIC LEARNING, Mar. 1993, at 20, 21; Mark Ivey, Long-Distance
Learning Gets an 'A' at Last, Bus. WK., May 9, 1988, at 108, 109-10. One government
report recently suggested that the development of networks could lead to the availability
to all students of the "best schools, teachers, and courses.., without regard to geography,
distance, resources, or disability." INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra
note 1, at 3. See also Tracy Grant, Getting a Leg Up on Learning, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7,
1994 (describing Boston students using computers to contact students in Costa Rica, Swit-
zerland, and Canada); Josh Hyatt, Bonds Formed from a Distance; Students Use Computers
to Talk with Disabled Patients, Break Down Barriers, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 1993,
(Metro/Region), at 1.
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its potential for individual expression.32 This characteristic allows the
NI to further this important First Amendment goal.33 The expression
furthered by the NI can best be appreciated in the context of the
wide variety of social structures that develop through computer net-
works.3 4 Although self-expression will be affected by the technologi-
cal characteristics, of the -NIl, it should not be removed from
constitutional purview.3 5
32. INFORMATION INFRASTRucTURE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 9:
[T]he NI will be of maximum value to users if it is sufficiently "open" and inter-
active so that users can develop new services and applications or exchange infor-
mation among themselves, without waiting for services to be offered by the firms
that operate the NIl. In this way, users will develop new "electronic communi-
ties" and share knowledge and experiences that can improve the way that they
learn, work, play, and participate in the American democracy.
For purposes of this Article, a network is an entity that provides facilities for multiple
people to communicate with one another directly; the defining characteristic of such a
network is the ability for "ordinary people" to use the network actively to communicate
with more than one other person simultaneously. Examples include telephone networks
with conferencing capabilities, Internet and Prodigy@, but not cable television networks or
the mails. Communication with more than one person is critical because only with at least
three people can a debate have an audience and deserve the label "public." Compare
discussion infra Part I(C)(2) with text accompanying notes 111-115.
33. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individual's
interest in self-expression is a concern of the Frst Amendment separate from the concern
for open and informed discussion .... ").
34. Through common interest groups, people can become introduced to and carry on
discussions with others whom they have never met, and perhaps could not meet, for geo-
graphical reasons. See generally HOWARD RHEiNGoLD, THE VIRTuAL CommruNrrY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECrRONIC FRONTIER (1993). For example, one article de-
scribes a common interest group devoted to discussing movie reviews with 500 members,
most of whom, presumably, had never met. Finholt & Sproull, supra note 22, at 52.
By lessening the effects of distance, networking can facilitate continuing friendships
despite geographical separations. See Douglas M. Pravda & Andrew L. Wright, University
Moves Onto Infohighway: Students, Faculty, Administrators Log-On ih Unprecedented
Numbers, HARv. CRIMsON, Apr. 5, 1994, at 1, 3 (noting that one college student "has set
up and run an electronic bulletin board that allows 30 members of his high school class...
to keep in touch"); Lewis, supra note 19, at C1 (describing one person who sends an esti-
mated 25 messages a week over the computer network compared to one paper letter a
month; that person noted, "Were it not for E-mail, there are some people with whom I
would not communicate."); Pair Weds Via Computer Link, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 14, 1993,
at A12 (describing a wedding on-line by a couple that met on-line).
Cf Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 n.22 (1981)
("Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit
control over their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie
the association's being."); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
294 (1981) ("[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve
a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process.").
35. Networks can influence the experience of communication. For example, after a
series of experiments, one team of social science researchers noted:
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Whether as textual messages, audio-visual programming, or in
some other form, the information exchanged over the NII's networks
will usually constitute protected speech for First Amendment pur-
poses. The communicative nature of the information exchanged, not
only as a means for debate on public issues but also as a means of self-
expression, supports such constitutional protection.
B. Potential for Overreaching by Network Regulators
This new technology's potentially critical role in society also
holds great potential for abuse. Stories about people who send
messages with misleading identification over networks are wide-
spread.3 6 A government or a network owner has a legitimate interest
in regulating speech on networks.37 However, such regulations imme-
diately raise First Amendment concerns. For example, a regulation
requiring accurate identification of messages could be seen as analo-
Using a network induced the participants to talk more frankly and more equally.
Instead of one or two people doing most of the talking, as happens in many face-
to-face groups, everyone had a more equal say. Furthermore, networked groups
generated more proposals for action than did traditional ones.
Lee Sproull & Sara Kiesler, Computers, Networks, and Work, in SOCIAL ISSUES IN COM-
PUTING, supra note 23, at 335, 338. Those researchers also noted that consensus building
was more difficult and people tended to express extreme opinions more openly over the
network than in face-to-face interactions. I. at 338-39.
Other phenomena noted in network interaction included a diminished importance of
status and increased confidence and liveliness for those who felt uncomfortable speaking at
meetings. Id. at 339 (citing others). Cf. JUSTINE DE LACY, The Sexy Computer, in COM-
PUTERS IN THE HUMAN CONTEXT 228, 230-31 (Tom Forester ed., 1989) (describing French
networking experience and noting a propensity for on-line flirting and intimacy).
36. One noteworthy example involved a false news release, distributed under the
guise of an Associated Press release, that claimed that the Microsoft Corporation had
agreed to acquire the Roman Catholic Church. The false information was read on Rush
Limbaugh's national television program. Peter H. Lewis, Computer Jokes and Threats Ig-
nite Debate on Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at 1. As another example, one
student at Harvard, posing as another student, made sexual advances toward a third stu-
dent. Douglas M. Pravda & Andrew L. Wright, Fake E-Mail, Other Abuses Plague 'Net':
College Struggles to Regulate Ethics on Electronic Frontier, HARV. CRIMSON, Apr. 6, 1994,
at 1; see also LINDSY VAN GELDER, The Strange Case of the Electronic Lover, in COM-
PUTERIZATION AND CONTROVERSY: VALUE CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL CHOICES 364
(Charles Dunlop & Rob Kling eds., 1991) (describing the case of a male psychologist pre-
tending to be severely disfigured female mute); Finholt & Sproull, supra note 22, at 60-61
(describing an April Fool's prank suggesting the corporation that employed the users of
the computer network had sold their division).
37. Typically, to regulators, generalized regulation of speech seems more appropriate
when applied to novel technologies. Cf. WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS
OF T=E FIRST AMENDMENT 60-61 (1984) (describing modern justifications for licensing of
radio and television as reminiscent of sixteenth century justifications for licensing printing
presses in England).
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gous to a ban on anonymous pamphleteering, which "falls with much
greater force upon individuals and groups who fear majoritarian dis-
approval and reprisal-upon dissidents and upon the unpopular-
than upon those with widely approved messages to deliver; thus the
[Supreme] Court has again demanded more than minimal justification
for bans of this type. '38
Regulations on computer networks may be divided into two cate-
gories: those imposed by the operator of a particular network upon its
users and those imposed by the government upon the use of all net-
works within its jurisdiction.39 Constitutionally, the latter category
may seem more relevant because such action would seem more likely
to cross any "state action" hurdle4° and, by application throughout a
jurisdiction, would likely minimize alternative channels of communi-
cation. However, as a practical matter, restrictions by network opera-
tors seem likely to be more prolific, more invasive to people using the
network, and more effectively enforced than general government reg-
ulations. This is true because network operators will interact with the
people using the network more directly than the government will. For
example, one commercial network, Prodigy, banned "public"
messages that complained about rate increases and eventually ban-
ished the people who attempted to organize a boycott of its advertis-
ers.41 Therefore, regulation by the network operators will be the
focus of this Article. 42
38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMrRicAN CONSTITTONAL LAW § 12-23, at 980 & § 13-
31, at 1151 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87, 88 (1982), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976), and Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960)).
39. I do not attempt here to define the reach of "jurisdiction" in cyberspace. I merely
note that I anticipate "jurisdiction" will have some meaning in cyberspace.
40. See e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (setting forth factors to
determine if state action is implicated). But cf Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-
25 (1981) (holding that state-paid public defender's decision not to appeal a case was not
state action).
41. Naughton, supra note 5, at 409-10.
42. Of course, one can imagine general government regulations that raise interesting
issues in a variety of contexts. The misidentification examples cited supra in note 36 sug-
gested a requirement of accurate identification. Likewise, the government may try to insti-
tute regulations directed at minimizing electronic harassment. Such regulations already
exist regarding telephone usage. See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Tele-
phone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YAiE J. ON REG. 99, 106-07 (1986). Just as reason-
able regulations aimed at limiting harassment in a residential area have been upheld,
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding residential anti-picketing ordinance),
anti-harassment regulations could probably pass scrutiny in the electronic context as well.
Other prohibitions, such as regulations prohibiting electronic "chain letters," could raise
other issues, such as the definition of "chain letter" in a medium in which forwarding
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C. Specific Examples of Network Regulation
Specific examples may be helpful to illustrate the implications of
the constitutional analysis that this Article will undertake. This Sec-
tion describes three hypothetical forums-a political conference, 43 a
Cronies conference, and a health care conference-which will be ref-
erenced throughout the rest of the Article. This Section will also de-
scribe some of the options that may be available in creating other
conferences.
(1) A Sketch of the Landscape of the Nil
The critical difference between the NII and the cable television
networks, for purposes of this Article, is the ability on the NII for
individuals to communicate actively. 4 For purposes of discussion,
these acts of communication will be described in units called
"messages." It is assumed that there will be message-delivery systems
and that these systems will operate as partnerships between shared
networks and individual resources. 45 Messages could be in a variety
of formats: text, video, audio, or multi-media. Messages could be sent
to a single person, to a group of people, or to computers. 46 Messages
could be intended for either immediate reception-like words spoken
over the telephone-or for reception at the convenience of the recipi-
ent-like mail that is actually received only when the recipient opens
it. 4
7
In order to facilitate a message-delivery system, it seems likely
that each person will be assigned an address within the network, much
like a telephone number. When sending a message, a person would
specify the address of the recipient. A message-delivery system would
messages is a common practice. See DERN, supra note 28, at 154 (noting that the capability
to forward messages constitutes part of the "basic set of functions" for electronic mail).
Such general government regulations are not the focus of this Article.
43. Many names have been given to the various kinds of high-tech forums, including
bulletin board, conference, distribution list, multi-user dungeon, mailing list, and new-
sgroup. For purposes of this Article, all high-tech forums that allow multiple people to
send messages to a number of people who, likewise, respond to the same group will be
called conferences. This reflexive quality is critical to ensure that the participants in fact
have the opportunity to "confer."
44. For the definition of network used in this Article, see supra note 32.
45. By analogy, placing a telephone call involves a partnership between an individ-
ual's telephone, which may have a feature allowing recall of specific telephone numbers,
and the telephone network, which connects sites.
46. For example, under a "pay-per-view" scheme, a person might send a message to a
computer owned by a cable company in order to request a movie.
47. The former kind of message is called "synchronous"; the latter kind of message is
called "asynchronous."
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also have a facility to send the same message to multiple recipients
when multiple addresses are specified.
(2) A Political Conference and a "Cronies" Conference
Sending messages to the same group of addresses could be a fre-
quent task if a set of people has a common interest. Therefore, a
message-delivery system would probably have a facility by which peo-
ple could be collected under one address into a "message group.
48
For example, imagine a person named Wendy has a large set of friends
in the same political party to whom she plans to send frequent de-
scriptions of political developments. She expects that they will find
these notices interesting. Rather than remembering all of her friends
who are interested in her political messages, Wendy could collect their
addresses into a message group called "Politics," and the message-de-
livery system would allow her to refer to that message group with a
special address. To distribute her political messages to her Politics
message group, Wendy would send them to that special address.
A message-delivery system could provide a variety of options for
use of message groups. One possibility would be to open the message
group to multiple senders. Perhaps Wendy's friend Bob would also
like to send messages to the Politics message group; upon Wendy's
request, the message-delivery system would be able to make the
message group available to Bob, or to any other set that Wendy speci-
fied. For example, Wendy might choose to make the Politics message
group "open to senders," meaning that anyone interested in sending a
message to the message group would be permitted to do so, whether
she knew them or not. Because Wendy's Politics message group is
composed of her friends and members of her political party, she may
want to limit the messages sent to her Politics mailing group to those
she thinks relevant. A message-delivery system may allow her to act
as "moderator" of the group and screen messages for appropriateness
before they are sent.
The options described above can have a substantial impact upon
the character of a mailing group.49 For example, allowing multiple
48. For electronic mail, these message groups are usually called mailing lists. See
DERN, supra note 28, at 481-95 (describing electronic mailing lists as "[o]ne of the most
powerful outgrowths of electronic mail").
49. Other options are also available. One option is to change the way in which people
receive messages from the conference. For example, Wendy might renounce control of the
message group and permit any person to become a recipient at his or her request and to
receive conference messages from that moment on. In fact, the messages could be saved in
a public archive, available to any person interested, at any time after archiving was started.
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people to send messages to the message group provides an opportu-
nity for debate among them, carried on in front of the other members
of the group (assuming they are members of the group themselves and
receive each others' messages). Under this scenario, the message
group is transformed into a conference because multiple people are
contributing and receiving messages. The debates can be described as
occurring "in" the conference.50
First Amendment issues raised by access to or participation in the
conference may be sharpened if the message-delivery system support-
ing the conference is supplied or subsidized by the government.
Other hypothetical conferences may raise First Amendment concerns
even more directly. For example, a city mayor may want to use gov-
ernment systems to facilitate a conference to discuss pertinent issues
with the city cabinet, leaders of the mayor's party, and a few city lead-
ers, but not members of an opposition party. The mayor might call
this a Cronies conference.
(3) A Health Care Conference
Having surveyed the landscape for describing messages, one can
appreciate the role that electronic conferences might play in encour-
aging public debate. For example, imagine that a government system
See, e.g., DERN, supra note 28, at 495 ("If you want to keep an archive of the messages
[sent to a conference], you may need additional disk space."). Thus, people would be able
to view messages sent to the conference before they were even aware that the conference
existed.
Another option is to limit messages to either synchronous or asynchronous messages.
One example of a system that operates synchronously is the Internet Relay Chat system,
widely available on the Internet. See id. at 510-11 ("During the Persian Gulf War in 1991,
for example, I 'listened' briefly, as dozens of users from all over the world, from Germany
to Finland, Israel and Australia, made comments and discussed events, with an occasional
pause as certain users had to put on gas masks."). One advantage of limiting messages to
synchronous distribution is that it provides for much speedier interactions; however, the
membership in such conferences would be highly variable, thus diminishing the sense of
community that might be found in asynchronous conferences.
, 50. On the Internet, it is common to refer to discussions that use such conferences as
taking place "in the conference." See, e.g., DERN, supra note 28, at 494 ("The name of the
[conference] is 'storytellers' and that's where the primary discussion takes place."). Actu-
ally, there may be no physical place that corresponds to an actual location for the discus-
sion because the messages might simply be distributed to all recipients of the conference,
viewed, and deleted. The "location" of the debate would likewise be distributed among all
the recipients. Thus, it probably is sensible to refer to the location where the various at-
tributes of the conference (such as the participants) are specified as the "virtual location"
of the conference. However, because attributes might be distributed over several locations
(e.g., the recipients of one conference could be defined as multiple sets of recipients of
other conferences), pinpointing even a "virtual location" could prove tricky. See infra note
247 and accompanying text.
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has been set aside to permit private citizens to create their own con-
ferences free of charge. Imagine further that one such conference-
open to all message senders and recipients who wish to join, and
archived for future reference-becomes especially well known for its
thoughtful and illuminating discussions on a particular policy issue
such as health care. In fact, suppose this conference becomes so well
known that the President joins.51 If the discussion includes scathing
criticism of the President's plans, the President might become un-
happy and suggest that this conference be moderated or removed out-
right.52 After all, the President might argue, the government should
be able to control how its property-here, its messaging system-is
used.
The question presented by this Article is whether the public fo-
rum doctrine should provide any protection to the "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open" 53 debate occurring on networks and conferences
like the ones described here.
H. Should the Networks that Compose the NI Be
Considered Public Forums?
In Part I, this Article described a variety of situations in which the
NII might play a significant role. In addressing issues raised in those
kinds of situations, other commentators have queried whether net-
works54 should be considered public forums and whether the First
Amendment should thus afford protection to the people sending
51. Cf John Aloysius Farrell, Calling Sen. Kennedy via the Computer, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1993 (describing how to reach Senator Kennedy's office via electronic
mail and noting that his office puts all of his public remarks and press releases out on the
network immediately); Lewis, Cyberspace, Overcrowding, supra note 18, at D5 (describing
the sending of electronic mail to politicians); Peter Lewis, Gore Preaches, and Practices, the
Techno-Gospel, N.Y. TiMws, Jan. 17, 1994, at D1 (noting that White House officials occa-
sionally participate in the White House Forum on the Compuserve network, describing
President Clinton receiving electronic mail and responding off-line, and giving Vice Presi-
dent Gore's electronic mail address).
52. Of course, other reactions are also plausible. The President might be bored and
tune out. Another possibility is that the President would be enthralled by the rich debate,
but irritated by occasional (or frequent) comments irrelevant to health care; the President
might want the creator of the conference to moderate the discussion in a "content-neutral"
fashion that limited the discussion to "real" health care issues. Alternatively, the President
might decide to set up a "presidential" conference open to all; perhaps it would be specifi-
cally dedicated to health care issues and moderated by an administration official in a "con-
tent-neutral" fashion to guard against irrelevant commentary. See discussion infra Part
m(C)(2)(a).
53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
54. For the definition of network used in this Article, see supra note 32.
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messages over those networks.5 5 This Part of the Article will reexam-
ine these analyses in light of the developments that the NII will bring.
The First Amendment plays a critical role in promoting rich dis-
course and exchange of ideas.56 Not only does speech occupy a spe-
cial place in the Bill of Rights, it also has a critical function in a
democracy. 57 Yet, private network operators may attempt to limit
speech by availing themselves of two constitutional doctrines that pro-
vide protection from judicial scrutiny: the state action doctrine and
the public forum doctrine.
A. The Constitutional Absence of State Action
As currently envisioned, private carriers will primarily own and
operate the Information Superhighway, much as current information
systems and networks operate through use of federally-regulated pri-
vately-owned telephone lines.5 8 Under constitutional doctrines, the
guarantees of the First Amendment, when they apply at all, generally
limit only state action.59 Therefore, it would seem difficult to invoke
First Amendment protections against actions like Prodigy's refusal to
allow a person to use its network. 60 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has on rare occasions allowed litigants to invoke the protections of the
Constitution against private actors. A litigant must make one of two
arguments: the public function argument-that the private entity has
taken on a public function;61 or the entanglement argument-that the
government is so entangled with the private entity as to make the two
55. See sources cited supra note 5.
56. See infra note 152.
57. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST- A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
105 (1980) (asserting that the rights usually associated with the First Amendment,
"whether or not they are explicitly mentioned, must nonetheless be protected, strenuously
so, because they are critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic
process").
58. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTR TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 6; see also Wright,
supra note 18, at 20.
59. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) ("The core issue presented in
this case is not whether petitioners were discharged because of their speech . . . , but
whether the school's action in discharging them can fairly be seen as state action."); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) ("[P]rivate action is immune from the restrictions of the Four-
teenth Amendment .. ") (utility not a state actor); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("That 'Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' is a restraint on government
action, not that of private persons.").
60. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
61. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (company-owned town).
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inseparable for purposes of constitutional analysis.62 However, the
Court has severely limited the reach of both of these exceptions.
(1) Could a Private Network Perform a Public Function?
In the seminal case applying the First Amendment to a private
actor that had taken on a public function, Marsh v. Alabama,63 a Jeho-
vah's Witness was prosecuted for criminal trespass for distributing
literature on the streets of a "company town" without a license.6 4 In
overturning the conviction and creating a right of access to the land,
the Court held that the ownership of the town put the company into a
position equivalent to that of the State: "Whether a corporation or a
municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has
an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such man-
ner that the channels of communication remain free."65
This "public function exception" has been severely limited by
more recent cases. For example, the Supreme Court has held that pri-
vately-owned shopping malls open to the general public-a prime
contemporary example of private property owners who invite the pub-
lic onto their land and provide many seemingly public functions, such
as sidewalks, streets, and parking-are not subject to constitutional
restrictions placed on the state. In Hudgens v. NLRB 66 and Lloyd
62. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,725 (1961) (treating opera-
tion of a private restaurant within a public parking garage as state action for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes).
63. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
64. Id. at 503-04.
65. Id. at 507; see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 302 (1966) (noting that
"when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject
to its constitutional limitations" and concluding that "the public character of th[e] park
requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth
Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law").
For a discussion of the proper judicial role in separating private actors from public, see
TRmE, supra note 38, § 18-5, at 1706 n.4 (suggesting comparison with Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,546-47,556 (1985), in which Court rejected "as
unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule... that turns on a judicial ap-
praisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional"' and pre-
ferred a system under which "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power
is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides
through state participation in federal governmental action"); see also Duncan Kennedy,
The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 1349 (1982)
(arguing against the usefulness of the distinction between the public and private spheres);
Seidman, supra note 16, at 1047 ("Courts are suited to play a mediating role between pub-
lic and private spheres because they are the most private of our public institutions.").
66. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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Corp. v. Tanner,67 the Court rejected the claimed First Amendment
right of individuals to picket at privately-owned shopping malls, stat-
ing that "[t]he Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated
doctrine of dedication of private property to public use," 68 and con-
cluded that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no
part to play" 69 in such cases. The Court distinguished and narrowed
Marsh by noting that Marsh
involved the assumption by a private enterprise of all of the attrib-
utes of a state-created municipality and the exercise of that enter-
prise of semi-official municipal functions as a delegate of the State.
In effect, the owner of the company town was performing the full
spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State.
70
Although the services provided in Lloyd and Hudgens-side-
walks, streets, and parking areas-are traditional municipal func-
tions,71 other services that have critical public components can be
provided by networks. Networks already are used to provide elec-
tronic libraries, distribute SEC filings, collect taxes, cover town coun-
cil meetings, provide outlets for public debate, and take pollS.72
Poll taking may have special significance in determining public
function status. For example, in Smith v. Allwright,73 the Supreme
Court held that the exclusion of blacks from the Texas Democratic
Party violated the Fifteenth Amendment even though the party was a
"voluntary" organization. The Court reasoned that "the recognition
of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that
state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of
primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the
party's action the action of the State."74 Because the polls taken over
networks are not yet part of the formal political process, it seems un-
67. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
68. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569).
69. Id. at 521.
70. Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569).
71. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of
Ideas, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 965, 973 (1993) ("As we gather here in the final decade of the
twentieth century, the postindustrial processes of bureaucratization, consumerization, com-
mercialization, and mass media saturation threaten substantially to transform our experi-
ence of the market. The Athenian agora is now the local shopping mall."); RAY
OLDENBURG, TimE GREAT GOOD PLACE 119 (1989) ("But, facades aside, the shopping
mall is a sterile place when compared to prewar small towns and their main streets.").
72. See sources cited supra notes 21-30.
73. 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).
74. Id. at 660; see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that exclusion of
black citizens from association of voters constituted violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
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likely that networks would be seen as having taken on a public func-
tion based on their facility to provide this service. Although other
network services, such as tax filings, SEC filings, and provision of i-
brary resources, do undertake traditionally municipal functions, a net-
work provider still might not reach the standard of Hudgens as
"performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and [standing] in
the shoes of the State."
75
The development of the NII may inspire federal and state govern-
ments to make better use of network technology. It is already antici-
pated that the NII will be used to provide access to government
information and an "electronic government" that will deliver benefits
electronically for programs such as federal retirement, social security,
unemployment insurance, AFDC, and food stamps.76 Certainly the
NII could be used for voting or for primaries, 77 or for "electronic town
meetings, 78 which are critical to democracy. These functions are just
as critical as the public primaries described in Allwright. If such serv-
ices are provided, a court may limit its scrutiny of the private actor to
the specific public function at issue, like the voting functions, without
applying First Amendment doctrines to the actor generally. Indeed,
given the more recent cases, such as Hudgens, in order to reach the
level of scrutiny applied in Marsh for limitations on speech not di-
rectly related to the political process, the network may have to assume
a wider variety of attributes. Without a radical reordering of contem-
porary understanding of certain state attributes, such as police serv-
ices, 79 it seems unlikely that the operators of the NII will be
75. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976); cf. Taviss, supra note 5, at 781-85
(analyzing state action n the electronic forum context)"
76. I roRlMA-ON lINzAsTucruIp TASki FoRcE, supra note 1, at 17; see also id. at
11 ("Thomas Jefferson said that information is the currency of democracy.... Improve-
ment of the nation's information infrastructure provides a tremendous opportunity to im-
prove the delivery of government information to the taxpayers who paid for its collection
,...."); JoHN STUART MILL, THRmE ESSAYS: ON LIBERTY 139 (Oxford Univ. Press 1975)
(1859):
I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in
view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the
difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power
consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information,
and diffusion of it from the centre.
77. See sources cited supra note 30.
78. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28.
79. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946) ("A deputy of the Mobile County
Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman.").
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characterized as standing in the shoes of the state unless they are actu-
ally part of the state.80
(2) Could a Private Network Become Inseparable from Government?
A litigant who advances the "entanglement argument" also faces
substantial obstacles in seeking constitutional protection for expres-
sion on private electronic networks open to the public. The arche-
typal entanglement case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,81
analyzed whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied to a private
restaurant that leased space in a government-owned parking garage
and refused service to William Burton because he was black.82
Although the discrimination rule was formally and independently
made by the private restaurant, the Court found that the connection
between the Parking Authority and the restaurant exceeded the
threshold for state action. The Court based its decision on a variety of
factors including indirect governmental profit and the sharing of gov-
ernmental power, property, and prestige.83
Later entanglement doctrine cases paralleled the public function
doctrine cases in that the Court required a high threshold before find-
ing enough entanglement to impute state action to a private actor.
For example, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,84 teachers at a private school
claimed that their discharge had contravened their First Amendment
rights of free speech.85 The school specialized in dealing with students
with special needs and, therefore, received student referrals from the
public schools.86 The school also received substantial state funding
80. But see infra text accompanying notes 101-106.
81. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
82. Id. at 716-17.
83. Id. at 724-25. The court noted:
It is irony amounting to grave injustice that in one part of a single building, er-
ected and maintained with public funds by an agency of the State to serve a public
purpose, all persons have equal rights, while in another portion, also serving the
public, a Negro is a second-class citizen, offensive because of his race, without
fights and unentitled to service, but at the same time fully enjoys equal access to
nearby restaurants in wholly privately owned buildings .... By its inaction, the
Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal
of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint partici-
pant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to
have been so "purely private" as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
84. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
85. Id. at 837.
86. Id. at 832.
and was regulated by state officials.8 7 Nonetheless, noting that "the
school's fiscal relationship with the State is not different from that of
many contractors performing services for the government," the Court
concluded that the school had developed "[n]o symbiotic relationship
such as existed in Burton."88 Likewise, in considering whether the ac-
tions of a broadcast licensee were subject to constitutional scrutiny, a
plurality of the Court held that because the licensee performed a jour-
nalistic role and the Federal Communications Commission had not
fostered the licensee's challenged policies, "it cannot be said that the
Government is a 'partner' to the action of the broadcast licensee ....
nor is it engaged in a 'symbiotic relationship' with the licensee, profit-
ing from the invidious discrimination of its proxy."8 9
Unless the government becomes intimately identified with a par-
ticular information service, 90 it seems unlikely that a court would find
sufficient entanglement with a speech-restricting private network to
constitute state action.91 As discussed above, a court would probably
not find that operating a private information system fits the public
function paradigm sufficiently to attribute the operator's actions to
the state.92 Therefore, it seems unlikely under current First Amend-
ment jurisprudence that a court would find a private network operator
that restricts speech to be a state actor.93
87. Id. at 832-33.
88. Id. at 843. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) ("Even extensive regulation by the government does not
transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the government.").
89. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119
(1973). The Court noted that "[t]he First Amendment does not reach acts of private par-
ties in every instance where the Congress or the Commission has merely permitted or
failed to prohibit such acts." d. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177
(1972) (holding that recipient of state liquor license not a "state actor" for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
90. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 720, 725 (1961) (noting
that "the Authority located at appropriate places [on the building] official signs indicating
the public character of the building, and flew from mastheads on the roof both the state
and national flags" and concluding that "[b]y its inaction.... the State ... has elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination"). But cf. San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 545 n.27 (noting that although the Olympic
Committee "performs the 'distinctive, traditional governmental function' of 'represent[ing]
this Nation to the world community,' ... absent the additional element of governmental
control, this representational function can hardly be called traditionally governmental" (al-
teration in the original) (citation omitted) (quoting Brennan, J., dissenting)).
91. See Taviss, supra note 5, at 783.
92. See supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
93. See Taviss, supra note 5, at 770-73.
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However, with the development of the NII, a court might find
sufficient government entanglement so that some actions by network
operators may constitute state action. After all, the NII will not be
merely a bigger network. Rather, it has been described in government
literature as a system in which "government has an essential role to
play."94 Moreover, "the government has a duty to ensure that all
Americans have access to the resources of the Information Age" and
"government will ensure that users can transfer information across
networks easily and efficiently. ' 95 If the government takes these du-
ties seriously, it may be determined to be intimately entangled with
the operation of the network.
In addition, the vast majority of Americans who are unsophistica-
ted in high-technology issues may already be acutely aware of the la-
bel "National Information Infrastructure" and perceive the networks
as governmental in nature. Accoutrements from which governmental
control may be inferred, like the flags flying over the parking garage
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,96 are an appropriate part
of the judicial inquiry.
On the other hand, the government apparently does not plan to
operate the networks.97 In fact, government literature emphasizes
that "[t]he private sector will lead the deployment of the NII" and
"the private sector role in NII development will predominate. ' 98 In
view of the overwhelming entanglement, including substantial funding
and regulation, evidenced in cases like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,99 in
which state action was not found, it seems unlikely that state action
would be found here. Moreover, once commercial network providers
begin to advertise more vigorously, it seems unlikely that the identifi-
cation of the NII with the federal government will even approach the
94. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 6.
95. Id.
96. 365 U.S. 715, 720 (1961).
97. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,864, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,773 (1993) (creating United States
Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure to "advise the Secretary [of
Commerce] on a national strategy for promoting the development of a National Informa-
tion Infrastructure" and stating that an issue for the Council to address is "the appropriate
roles of the private and public sectors in developing the National Information
Infrastructure").
98. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 6 (contrasting re-
cent investments by U.S. companies of more than fifty billion dollars annually in telecom-
munications infrastructure with the one to two billion dollars annually targeted for
government spending).
99. 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982).
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identification that the United States Olympic Committee has with the
nation, which was also held insufficient for constitutional purposes.100
The Court has recently signaled, under a confluence of justifica-
tions, a renewed willingness to attribute state action to a private actor.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,°0 the Court held that a civil
litigant's race-based exclusion of jurors by means of peremptory chal-
lenges violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 First, the Court found
that a private party was sufficiently entangled with the state because
the extensive government procedures that created the jury system and
the direct participation of the judge combined to place the prestige as
well as the legal framework behind the actor.103 Second, the Court
held that the private party was performing a traditionally public func-
tion given the jury's critical role in protecting litigants and ensuring
legitimacy of law and because, as a delegate of the state, a private
litigant's actions may fairly be attributed to the state.1°4 Finally, the
Court noted that because the purported racial discrimination occurred
in a courthouse, it offended the administration of justice and
"mar[red] the integrity of the judicial system.' 05
The networks that compose the NII are not expected to play a
central role in this nation's legal system. However, if the NII has a
pervasive impact on society'0 6 and especially if it serves a variety of
traditional public functions, the networks of the NIl-substantially
enabled by public regulations-may become important enough that
unscrutinized action, especially exclusionary action based on race or
gender, would be intolerable.
B. The Limited Use of the Public Forum Doctrine
Even if a network were operated by the government or if a net-
work operator were held to be a state actor in regulating speech on its
100. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 542-45 (1987). The Court held that the "fact that Congress granted it a corporate
charter does not render the USOC a Government agent.... Nor is the fact that Congress
has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word 'Olympic' dispositive.... [I]ntent on the
part of Congress to help the USOC obtain funding does not change the analysis." Id. at
543-44 (citation omitted).
101. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
102. Id. at 616; cf J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1419 (1994) (holding
unconstitutional the use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis
of gender).
103. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622-24.
104. Id& at 624-26.
105. Id. at 628.
106. See generally discussion supra Part I(A).
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network, the level of First Amendment scrutiny of some decisions by
the operator-even those directed at restricting speech-might be
quite low. Content-based government regulation of speech directed
at communications by people on their own property receives strict
scrutiny.107 However, there is a strong tradition that the government
usually carries a much lower, if any, burden for speech restrictions on
much of its own property. 10 8 Dean Mark Yudof states that the First
Amendment does not require heightened scrutiny of actions taken by
the Government Printing Office, government-sponsored newspapers
(e.g., STARS AND STRIPES), and public broadcasting stations. A view
requiring such heightened scrutiny, he adds, not only "flies in the face
of existing institutional arrangements," but also "rests on assumptions
about the illegitimacy of government expression in a democracy" and
"ignores the need for even democratic governments to communicate
effectively in order to advance public policies."'1 9 Similarly, there is
no question that it is permissible for the government, arbitrarily and
based on viewpoint, to restrict the access of those who wish to speak
at places like the White House.110
Of course, not all public property is like the White House. When
the government has dedicated its property to a use traditionally asso-
ciated with open debate, or when the government has dedicated its
property specifically for the purpose of public debate, the Supreme
Court has continually labeled that property a "public forum" and ap-
107. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 38, at 791-92:
If a government regulation is aimed at the communicative impact of an act.... [it
should be] unconstitutional unless government shows that the message being sup-
pressed poses a "clear and present danger," constitutes a defamatory falsehood,
or otherwise falls on the unprotected side of one of the lines the Court has drawn
to distinguish those expressive acts privileged by the first amendment from those
open to government regulation with only minimal due process scrutiny.
108. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990) (plurality opinion) (permit-
ting restrictions on postal sidewalk).
109. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERN-
MENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 240-41 (1983). The Court recently confirmed Yudof's
point in dictum: "When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b), it was not
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political phi-
losophy such as communism and fascism." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)
(dictum).
110. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (dictum) ("[T]he prohibition of unau-
thorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather infor-
mation he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that
does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right."); Fred Barnes,
Washington Diarist: How Special, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 1994, at 42 (describing the
overnight stay at the White House as "the ultimate perk a president can bestow").
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plied heightened scrutiny to governmental regulation'of speech in that
forum.1 1' Although this public forum doctrine should be tailor-made
for the envisioned high-tech Hyde Park, the Court has developed a
resistance to establishing novel kinds of locales (i.e., beyond parks,
streets, and sidewalks) as public forums. 11 2
In one line of cases, the Court developed a three-tiered classifica-
tion scheme for judicial review of state regulation of speech on public
property that is used as a forum for opinions. The description found
in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n 113 is the one
most commonly cited perhaps because it seems to provide the clearest
articulation of the doctrine. In Perry the Court noted that "[t]he exist-
ence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which
limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on
the character of the property at issue.' 1 4 The Court then articulated
its tripartite scheme, which includes traditional public forums, limited
public forums, and nonpublic forums:
[1. Traditional public forums:] In places which by long tradition
or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,
the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circum-
scribed.... In these quintessential public forums, the government
may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to en-
force a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce regulations
of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neu-
tral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
111. The most famous formulation was stated by Justice Roberts:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (plurality opinion). See
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) ("It is also true that 'public places' histori-
cally associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks,
and parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public forums.' In such places, the govern-
ment's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited ... .") (citations
omitted).
112. See infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
113. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
114. IL at 44.
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[2. Limited public forums:] A second category consists of public
property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place
for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce
certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if
it was not required to create the forum in the first place. [Footnote
7: A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use
by certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects.]
Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based
prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state
interest.
[3. Nonpublic forums:] Public property which is not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication is governed by
different standards. We have recognized that the "First Amend-
ment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is
owned or controlled by the government." In addition to time,
place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for
its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress ex-
pression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.
As we have stated on several occasions, "t] he State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."'
115
Public forum categorization, as described in Perry, requires two in-
quiries: whether there is a long tradition of public debate at the prop-
erty1 16 and, if not, whether the State has opened the property for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity.
In undertaking the first inquiry, the Supreme Court has been re-
luctant to find the requisite long tradition of public debate in anything
but the most traditional public forums. For example, in holding resi-
dential streets to be public forums, Justice O'Connor described public
streets and sidewalks as "traditional public fora" and stated that "[n]o
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is nec-
essary; all public streets are held in the public trust and are properly
considered traditional public fora." 1 7 However, two years later, Jus-
tice O'Connor undertook a more particular inquiry in considering the
status of publicly-owned sidewalks at post offices. She held that the
115. Id. at 45-46 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Presumably, a fourth cate-
gory of public property exists: nonforums, such as the White House, where it is consistent
with the Constitution to exclude speakers and "suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46.
116. No case or law review articl.e known to the author has attempted to construe the
"government fiat," id. at 45, phrase.
117. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988).
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postal sidewalk in the case did not have the thoroughfare "characteris-
tics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity," but
led "only from the parking area to the front door of the post of-
fice. ' 118 Moreover, the Court has not demonstrated a willingness to
find a traditional public forum by analogy. In holding that airport ter-
minals-which might have been reasonably analogized to rail stations,
bus stations, and wharves-are not traditional public forums, the
Court stated that "the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not
'transportation nodes' generally.""1
9
The recent widespread availability of multi-user networks, like
airports, 20 would seem to preclude a finding of traditional public fo-
rum status even for a government-owned network. An analogy of a
network to a public park, street, or sidewalk may not prove persuasive
in this context.' 2' Even the development of the NII, with its vaunted
118. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (plurality opinion).
119. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2707
(1992). One of the concurrences showed more of a willingness to draw analogies on a
functional basis. Justice Kennedy noted:
[I]t is evident that the public spaces of the Port Authority's airports are public
forums.... [T]he public spaces in the airports are broad, public thoroughfares full
of people and lined with stores and other commercial activities. An airport corri-
dor is of course not a street, but that is not the proper inquiry. The question is
one of physical similarities, sufficient to suggest that the airport corridor should
be a public forum for the same reasons that streets and sidewalks have been
treated as public forums by the people who use them.
... [W]hile most people who come to the Port Authority's airports do so for
a reason related to air travel, either because they are passengers or because they
are picking up or dropping off passengers, this does not distinguish an airport
from streets or sidewalks, which most people use for travel....
Third, and perhaps most important, it is apparent from the record, and from
the recent history of airports, that when adequate time, place, and manner regula-
tions are in place, expressive activity is quite compatible with the uses of major
airports.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2719 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104,116 (1972) ("The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.").
120. "[G]iven the lateness with which the modem air terminal has made its appear-
ance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having 'immemorially... time out of mind'
been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity." International
Soe'y for Krisha Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1992) (omission in origi-
nal) (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion)).
121. The Supreme Court has stated that "[e]ach medium of expression.., must be
assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its
own problems." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). One
lower court has noted that "the public forum doctrine is focused on messages rather than
on media, and it assumes that speech which is excluded from government-owned property
by virtue of a determination that that property is not a public forum can be effectively, if
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capability for speech, could not imbue a network with enough tradi-
tion to be held a traditional public forum. 22
In distinguishing between the "limited public forum" and the
"nonpublic forum," the relevant inquiry required by Perry is whether
the system is one "which the State has opened for use by the public as
a place for expressive activity."'1 23 For example, the Court in Perry
noted that there was "no indication in the record that the school mail-
boxes and interschool delivery system [at issue there were] open for
use by the general public." Thus, the Court concluded that the sys-
tem was not a public forum. 24
not as effectively, communicated elsewhere." Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v.
United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1339 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
One analogy might compare electronic networks with other kinds of networks. For
example, in Perry, the parties agreed that the low-tech network at issue, the school dis-
trict's interschool mail system, was "not a traditional public forum." Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). Likewise, the Court has held that a
charity drive network is a nonpublic forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). However, such an analogy would miss the special
capabilities of electronic networks, which result from a multiplicity of channels operating
at high speed over long distances and at low cost. See discussion supra Part I(A).
Other analogies have also been made. See Telecommunications Research & Action
Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Teletext, whatever its similarities to print
media, uses broadcast frequencies, and that ... would seem to be that."); Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991):
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional news
vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to an elec-
tronic news distributor such as CompuServe than that which is applied to a public
library, book store, or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow
of information.
See also Edward V. Di Lello, Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of
Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 199, 221-40 (1993)
(discussing application of PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), to Prod-
igy); Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amend-
ment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. Rev. 1147, 1161-89 (1993)
(comparing electronic information services to telephone, radio and television broadcasting,
and cable television); Eric Schlachter, Comment, Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free
Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Func-
tions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ETrr. L.J. 87 (1993) (analogizing on a per function basis);
Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1062 (1994) (outlining the significance of changes in electronic media
technology in a First Amendment context).
122. However, universal access restrictions on the NII, see infra note 143 and accompa-
nying text, might be thought of as "government fiat." Cf supra notes 115-116 and accom-
panying text.
123. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
124. Id. at 47. In fact, the Court noted that "[i]f by policy or by practice the Perry
School District has opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by the general public,
then PLEA [the union requesting mail system access] could justifiably argue a public fo-
rum has been created." Id. But cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that
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More recent cases have focused on purposeful action by the gov-
ernment in creating the designated public forum. The current doc-
trine, most recently exemplified by the Court in International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,125 requires a clearly articulated
government intent as a necessary prerequisite for the designation of
nontraditional public forums. In Lee the Court upheld a ban on solici-
tation in three airports owned by the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, holding that the regulation was reasonable and the fo-
rums were not public.126 The Court stated:
[T]he government does not create a public forum by inaction. Nor
is a public forum created "whenever members of the public are per-
mitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Govern-
ment." The decision to create a public forum must instead be made
"by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse."'127
The search to discover the relevant governmental intent in Lee
was driven by three factors: the commercial nature of airports, the
subjective beliefs of the governmental management expressed at trial,
and the manner of operation of the terminals.128 In conducting that
inquiry, the Court has developed a systematic bias toward finding a
forum to be nonpublic. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 29
the Court emphasized that the evidence of intent to create a public
forum must be demonstrably clear.' 30 In that case, the Court over-
turned a Court of Appeals determination that a high school newspa-
per Was a public forum by relying on the school board's policy
statements, curriculum guide, and course of conduct. 131 The Court
signaled that a high standard of clarity would be required before it
would find that a public forum was intended.
32
military base permitting free civilian access to certain unrestricted areas is a nonpublic
forum).
125. 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-06 (1992) (outlining the Perry framework).
126. Id. at 2708.
127. Id. at 2706 (quoting Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
128. Id. at 2707. The Court also asserted that it was trying to determine whether "a
[rather than the] principle purpose was 'promoting the free exchange of ideas."' Id. (em-
phasis added) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800). However, the Court's analysis actually
searched for "the [not a] purpose of the terminals;" whether the terminals had been "dedi-
cated" to expression; and the managers' "focus." Id. (emphasis added).
129. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
130. Id. at 270.
131. Id. at 268-70.
132. Cf. Jeffrey D. Smith, Comment, High School Newspapers and the Public Forum
Doctrine: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 74 VA. L. Rv. 843, 857 (1988) (criti-
cizing the Hazelwood majority's decision because "school authorities had demonstrated by
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Commentators have noted with dismay the circular or self-justify-
ing nature of the search for "the governmental purpose. ' 133 Since the
governmental purpose must be clear in order to find a designated pub-
lic forum, it appears that very few network forums will be able to sat-
isfy the analysis. Even if a private actor were treated as a state actor
for public forum purposes, the primary purpose of the forum would be
seen as commercial. If the network operator were actually the gov-
ernment, it would be surprising to find a governmental action with a
purpose as clear, and yet as amorphous, as promoting the free ex-
change of ideas. For example, the goals of the Clinton Administra-
tion's NII Initiative are listed in nine parts, three of which could,
arguably, provide evidence of a clear purpose to promote the free ex-
change of ideas.134 Thus, under current doctrines, it is unlikely that a
both policy and practice that [the newspaper] was a limited public forum for expressive
activity" (footnote omitted)).
133. See, e.g., David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IowA L. REv.
143, 187 (1992) ("[U]nder the modern forum doctrine, the Court will commonly defer to
the speech-hostile tendencies of the government officials."). Day concludes: "As one of
the constitutional bulwarks against censorial action by governmental officials, free speech
doctrine cannot hinge on the 'intent' of the very officials it was designed to constrain. Free
speech interests-if they are to actually be free--cannot be hostage to the government's
intent." Id. at 203. See also Gary E. Newberry, Note, Constitutional Law: International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the Public Forum a Closed Category?, 46
OKLA. L. REv. 155, 172 (1993):
The analysis ... in effect, grants the government sole power to classify a fo-
rum.... Most government property has a purpose other than the accommoda-
tion of First Amendment expressive activities.... It is difficult to conceive how
constitutional significance can be attached to the fact that airports involve travel
by airplane, and that streets involve travel by automobile.... Few public forums
would remain for the exercise of First Amendment expression if a forum's pur-
pose determined its status. Because streets and parks are not constructed with
the primary purpose of facilitating speech, under the [Lee] analysis even the quin-
tessential public forums would seem to lack the requirements necessary to consti-
tute a public forum. (footnotes omitted)
The author concludes that "[t]he Court's analysis makes it clear that few, if any, types of
property will be granted public forum status in the future." Id. at 174. See also Douglas
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 46 (1986) ("The most troubling thing about this
three-category formulation is that censorship can become self-justifying in the second and
third categories.").
134. The nine goals and principles are to: (1) promote private sector investment; (2)
extend the "universal service" concept to ensure that information resources are available
to all at affordable prices; (3) act as a catalyst to promote technological innovation and new
applications; (4) promote seamless, interactive, user-driven operation of the NII; (5) en-
sure information security and network reliability; (6) improve the management of the radio
frequency spectrum; (7) protect intellectual property rights; (8) coordinate with other
levels of government and with other nations; and (9) provide access to government infor-
mation and improve government procurement. INFORMATION INFRASTRUcTURE TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 6-7. The goals that could be used as evidence for the proposition
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network owned by or imputed to the government or the NII would be
held to be a designated public forum.
Scrutiny of government regulation of a nonpublic forum is usually
quite low. 135 The Court has held that "the State may reserve the [non-
public] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view.' 36 It should be expected that this viewpoint-neutral
reasonableness standard would be applied to government-owned net-
works or the Ni.
In Lee the Court's decision indicated that in a nonpublic forum,
the reasonableness requirement would have some bite. After all, the
decision of the Court of Appeals to strike down a restriction on
leafletting, as contrasted with solicitation, was affirmed. 137 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence was the only opinion that addressed the con-
stitutional distinction between leafletting and solicitation in this non-
public forum with approval:
While the difficulties posed by solicitation in a nonpublic forum are
sufficiently obvious that its regulation may ring of common-sense,
the same is not necessarily true of leafletting. To the contrary, we
have expressly noted that leafletting does not entail the same kinds
of problems presented by face-to-face solicitation. Specifically, one
need not ponder the contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order
mechanically to take it out of someone's hand.... With the possi-
ble exception of avoiding litter, it is difficult to point to any
problems intrinsic to the act of leafletting that would make it natu-
rally incompatible with a large, multi-purpose forum such as those
at issue here.' 38
that the principal purpose of the government is to promote the free exchange of ideas are
(2), (4), and (9).
135. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILI L.
Rv. 949, 967 (noting that government victory in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(1990), was "almost inevitable" once the forum at issue, a postal sidewalk, was classified as
nonpublic).
136. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983); accord
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("Con-
trol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity
so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral.").
137. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710
(1992) (per curiam).
138. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 2711,
2713-14 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations omitted); cf.
New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 1994 WL
708997, at *26 (N.J. Dec. 20, 1994) (holding that under state constitution free-speech provi-
sion, privately-owned regional & community shopping centers must permit leafletting on
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This kind of distinction indicates that some nontrivial reasonableness
scrutiny is applied even in a forum found to be nonpublic.
Even more recently, the Court has indicated that it takes the
viewpoint-neutrality requirement seriously as well. The issue was
raised by a school's decision to deny use of its facilities to show a
church's film series even though the facilities had been previously
used for other allegedly religious purposes. 139 The Court held that the
school's denial unconstitutionally applied a rule that the school prem-
ises not be used for religious purposes. 140 The Court reasoned that
"[t]he film involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise per-
missible.., and its exhibition was denied solely because the film dealt
with the subject from a religious standpoint.' 141 Thus, even if the gov-
ernment-owned networks were held to be nonpublic forums, govern-
ment managerial authority may be restricted in actions taken over
those networks that exhibit a bias toward a particular point of view. 142
societal issues) ("The free speech we have permitted ... leafletting only, no speeches, no
parades, no demonstrations - is the least intrusive form of free speech and the easiest to
control. The experience elsewhere proves the ability of those centers to absorb such
speech without harm.").
139. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2144-46
(1993).
140. Id. at 2144, 2147. In an opinion with some relatively light moments, see id. at 2148
n.7 (discussing Justice Scalia's late-night horror film anecdote), Justice White seemed espe-
cially titillated that a lecture series (entitled "Psychology and the Unknown" and spon-
sored by a "'New Age religious group') given with permission on school district property
was governed by the same rules. Id. at 2146-47 n.5.
141. Id. at 2147.
142. Cf. Buchanan, supra note 135, at 951 n.14 (preferring the label "nontraditional
public forum" to "nonpublic forum"). On the other hand, such protections may be sub-
sumed by a fact-intensive scrutiny. Justice O'Connor began her analysis by noting that
"'[t]he reasonableness of the Government's restriction [on speech in a nonpublic forum]
must be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circum-
stances."' Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2712 (1992) (concurrence) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense of Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985)). In that vein, she analogized
the airport regulations to those upheld in another nonpublic forum case, Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976), and she specifically noted that the forum there, certain parts of a
military base opened to the public, "sustained the kind of extensive, nonforum-related ac-
tivity found in the ... airports." Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2714 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She
contrasted the selective ban in Greer, which permitted prohibition of only those materials
constituting "a clear danger," id. (quoting Greer, 424 U.S. at 840) with the indiscriminate
one in Lee, which "effects an absolute prohibition and is not supported by any independent
justification outside of the problems caused by solicitation." Id.
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C. Networks that Compose the NII Wdl Probably Not Be Considered
Public Forums
As discussed, private network operators will probably not be con-
sidered state actors, and even if they are, the networks will be consid-
ered nonpublic forums. Thus, the level of First Amendment scrutiny
applied to regulatory decisions made by those operators, if any, will be
quite low.
The vague promise of universal access143 may provide a politi-
cally-based guarantee of free speech rights on the NIL A government
regulation ensuring universal access, which could effectively require
public access to private property, would probably not be problematic
under current constitutional doctrine. Challenges to such a regulation
could be based on the network operators' First Amendment speech
rights and their Fifth Amendment property rights, that is, they could
argue that required public access is a "taking" without just compensa-
tion. Such a regulation, like imposition of common carrier status upon
telecommunications providers, would probably not violate the opera-
tors' First Amendment rights.144 Similarly, like imposition of public
access upon a shopping mall, such a regulation would probably not
violate the network operators' Fifth Amendment rights because uni-
versal access would probably not be seen as a "taking."' 45 Although
the First Amendment does not require protection of individual speech
rights on private networks, it would not seem to prohibit the govern-
ment from stepping in and granting some protection.
143. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCrURE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3.
144. See, e.g., Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage: Approaches to Analyzing the
First Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1071 (1992). Campbell
explains:
Requiring a telephone company to operate on a common-carrier basis probably
does not violate its First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has found in
case after case that licensing broadcast stations does not violate the First Amend-
ment. If anything, the basis for licensing common carriers may be more compel-
ling than for licensing broadcasters.
Ld. at 1145 (footnote omitted). See also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2460-69 (1994) (holding that under appropriate findings of fact, must-carry regula-
tions would be constitutional); Nadel, supra note 21, at 245 (concluding that common car-
rier or leased access provisions, "which entail no economic burden on the cable operator
... are inherently consistent with the first amendment").
145. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) ("[H]ere, appellants
have failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or




Protecting First Amendment values is often seen as one of the
essential anti-majoritarian duties of the Court.146 The apparently min-
imal protection of speech on networks seems strikingly inadequate as
technology rapidly changes. Should presidential censorship of the
health care conference described above 47-especially one using a
government-owned system-really be immune from serious First
Amendment scrutiny? The apparent abdication of the public forum
doctrine in this lively context is striking and disconcerting. While the
state-action bar seems reasonably necessary in order to separate pub-
lic action from private,148 the failings of the public forum doctrine may
stem from technological myopia. The next Part of this Article probes
both the public forum doctrine and the particular structures that a
network can support. The Article then develops and justifies a more
nuanced approach that addresses public forum values within a fuller
understanding of the NII.
111. Which Parts of the Networks that Compose the N]il
Should Be Considered Public Forums?
As discussed, the current public forum doctrine presents an im-
pediment to protection of expressive activity on the NIl's networks-
even on government-owned networks. This Part will probe the vari-
ous justifications for the public forum doctrine while developing a
more complex view of the NIL. By focusing more closely on the theo-
ries that motivate the public forum doctrine and the particular struc-
tures provided on the NII, this Part argues that the public forum
doctrine can be used to protect expressive activity in some govern-
ment-owned or government-controlled parts of the NIL.
Attempts to classify networks as either traditional public forums
or nonpublic forums should be rejected. Rather than trying to analo-
gize a network to a park or an airport terminal, a network can be
more appropriately analogized to a complex new city within which
public and nonpublic forums can both exist. This approach is but-
tressed by the analyses of a number of thoughtful commentators. The
task is to find the public forums on the NIL Therefore, this Part of the
Article suggests a basic set of easily identifiable criteria for designated
public forums on the NIL: those government-owned or government-
146. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 105 (1980).
147. See supra Section I(C)(3).
148. See Seidman, supra note 16, at 1047 ("Judicial enforcement of constitutional rights
can best be understood as our society's imperfect effort to deal with the boundary problem,
particularly in the public/private context.").
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controlled forums that are non-profit with unlimited access to recipi-
ents and viewpoint-neutral access to a large number of senders. Fi-
nally, this Part attempts to address some of the issues, such as forum
topics, membership, costs, and closure, that will surely be raised in
future controversies.
A. Theories Justifying the Public Forum Doctrine
Many commentators have expressed discomfort with the provi-
sions of the public forum doctrine, primarily for its circularity and va-
cuity' 49 or inflexibility.150 Nonetheless, despite exaggerated reports of
its demise,' 5' the doctrine has not yet been overruled, and the Court
has not suggested an inclination to do so. In considering the applica-
tion of this doctrine to new technology-especially when, at first
glance, the application seems uncomfortably ill-suited-it is helpful to
reexamine the underpinnings of the special role of the public forum.
The First Amendment has served as a repository for a broad col-
lection of personal rights protecting social values related to free
speech. The literature on these principles is vast and familiar. 52
149. See eg., TRmE, supra note 38, § 12-24, at 987 (calling the public forum doctrine
"quite manipulable and problematic" and noting that "many recent cases illustrate the
blurriness, the occasional artificiality, and the frequent irrelevance, of the categories within
the public forum classification").
150. See eg., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 46,
93 (1987) ("Existing doctrine, with its myopic focus on formalistic labels, serves only to
distract attention from the real stakes in these disputes.").
151. Day, supra note 133, at 202 n.416 ("At this point, the modem forum doctrine is
basically a methodology to find that a particular location is a 'non-forum."'); Newberry,
supra note 133, at 174 (concluding that "few, if any, types of property will be granted
public forum status in the future").
152. See, eg., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties .... They valued liberty both as
an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty....
... To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no dan-
ger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of
the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
TRIE, supra note 38, at 785-1061. Professor Tribe argues that "[n]o adequate conception
of so basic an element of our fundamental law [as free speech] ... can be developed in
purely instrumental or 'purposive' terms." Id. § 12-1, at 785. Cf Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("IT]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
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Within this broad conception of values protected by the First Amend-
ment, the public forum, and especially the traditional public forum,
can be said to hold a "special position."'1 53 Certainly, public forums
can be critical to effective assembly because a right to assemble re-
quires locations for assembly. Public forums enhance communication
because they are "natural locations for those seeking to reach poten-
tial listeners." 154 The magnetic effect of public forums upon commu-
nication can improve opportunities for expression, as well as for
attainment of truth and assurances of participatory self-govern-
ment.155 Their openness can encourage diverse points of view.
(1) Professor Saphire and Formal Values
Professor Richard Saphire has defended the very formalism that
so many critics of the public forum doctrine attack as "both its under-
lying justification and its primary appeal. ' 156 Professor Saphire de-
scribes the doctrine as a "clearly discernible, easily [articulable], and
potentially objective framework for judicial analysis."' 57 He argues
that the doctrine serves the values often associated with the "rule-of-
law virtues," including the relative stability essential for a coherently
administrable legal system, the relative certainty and predictability
needed for fair administration of laws, and the attempt at objectivity
that undergirds the legitimacy of law.
158
Professor Saphire admits that a more flexible approach-such as
the one employed in Grayned v. City of Rockford159 that asks
"whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time"160 -may of-
fer better protection for expressive freedom than the Perry frame-
only ground upon which [people's] wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution.").
153. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (describing the historic impor-
tance of public forum property).
154. Allen S. Hammond, IV, Regulating Broadband Communication Networks, 9 YALE
J. ON REG. 181, 192 (1992) (quoting Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmatic Side of the First
Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (1981)).
155. BARBER, supra note 28, at 267-68 ("Without talk, there can be no democracy.
Whether in a marketplace, a public square (like the ancient Greek agora), a country store,
a barber shop, a school board, or a town meeting, democracy must have its local talk shop,
its neighborhood parliament.").
156. Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
739, 742 (1991).
157. Id. at 756 (describing the public forum doctrine in its "idealized form").
158. Id. at 754-55.
159. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
160. Id. at 116.
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work, but he insists on making a broader comparison.161 He suggests
that the concerns of commentators who criticize the public forum doc-
trine for its manipulability may not be satisfied by an even more flexi-
ble approach. 162 More pointedly, Professor Saphire notes that the
critics who prefer a more flexible test may not be advancing the free
speech causes they trumpet because "[t]here seems little basis for con-
fidence that the Court, especially the Rehnquist Court, would be any
more likely to invalidate regulations of speech were the public forum
doctrine discarded.' 63
Other scholars have developed more theoretical justifications for
the public forum doctrine. Professors Post and Berger have devel-
oped functional analyses of the motivations behind the public forum
doctrine, while Dean Farber and Mr. Yassky have developed views of
the public forum within larger constitutional theories. These scholars
are surveyed below.
(2) Professor Post: Distinguishing Governance from Management
Professor Robert Post, in his influential article on public forums,
has argued that the public forum decisions can be theoretically justi-
fied on more general principles.164 He summarizes those principles by
distinguishing the strict limitations on the government in its "govern-
mental" capacity from the greater deference given to government act-
ing in a "managerial" role. 65 Professor Post argues that the
161. Saphire, supra note 156, at 756 n.69, 757.
162. Id. at 758 n.77 (referring, as an example, to TRIE, supra note 38, § 12-24, at 992-
93). Interestingly, some scholars look wistfully at the structure and certainty of the public
forum categories as a model for making the doctrine less flexible in other areas. See, e.g.,
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Gov-
ernment-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 722-23 ("Like the 'spheres of neutrality'
approach I have proposed, the Court's context-specific public forum inquiry accommo-
dates the competing values and dangers associated with government-supported speech by
designating institutional spheres of neutrality in a non-neutral world."); David Goldberger,
A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the
Costs of Using America's Public Forums, 62 TEx. L. Rtv. 403, 431 ("Application of the
public forum approach to pecuniary requirements would have important advantages other
than that of simplicity. The approach would be more likely than the Cox approach to
generate decisions consistent with first amendment policies.") (describing Cox approach to
charges for use of the public forum as upholding "charges that are designed to recoup
governmental costs, except when those charges are prohibitive").
163. Saphire, supra note 156, at 758.
164. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory
of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987).
165. Professor Post states:
When the state acts to govern the speech of the general public, it is subject to the
restrictions of what we would ordinarily think of as the "usual" principles of first
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government acts in its sovereign (i.e., highly scrutinized) role when it
regulates speech in traditional public forums because it is governing
the speech of the general public, whereas in nonpublic forums, the
government acts as a manager motivated by its "legitimate organiza-
tional goals."'
1 66
Perhaps more general principles reign in these public forum
cases, but they nonetheless highlight a narrowly tailored category de-
serving of careful study. Professor Post admits that public forum cases
have identifiable characteristics, a primary one being that "members
of the general public seek to use a resource over which the govern-
ment claims managerial control."'1 67 In fact, in distinguishing between
public and nonpublic forums, Professor Post concludes that even a test
of traditional access is "probative of underlying social practices that
are themselves determinative of the authority ceded to the govern-
ment in the regulation of speech.' 68 He adds that the "public forum
doctrine has much to teach us about the nature and limits of our de-
mocracy.' 69 Thus, while pointing out that public forums are gov-
erned by general principles of law usually reserved for private entities,
Professor Post concedes that it is the designation of a government-
controlled forum as "public" (and subjected to governance rather than
management principles) that occupies a special place in jurisprudence.
(3) Professor Berger: Functional Attributes of a Public Forum
Professor Curtis Berger has tried to articulate the special charac-
teristics of a marketplace, his prototype public forum, as contrasted
with the characteristics of a private home. 70 He notes that the mar-
ketplace is characterized by the following elements: lower expecta-
tion of privacy, no expectation of quiet, entry from multiple points,
restricted freedom of association, privilege of entry at no cost, lack of
territoriality for non-merchants, and reduced expectation of secur-
ity.171 By contrast, Professor Berger introduces a different set of char-
amendment adjudication.... When acting with managerial authority, a govern-
ment institution may to a significant degree control speech as necessary to attain




168. Id. at 1834.
169. Id. at 1835.
170. Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 633, 654 & n.127 (1991) (noting that "the word 'forum' denotes the mar-
ketplace of ancient Rome").
171. Id. at 655.
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acteristics that denote a home private: expectation of privacy,
expectation of quiet, limited physical access, freedom of association,
right of exclusion, exclusivity of possession, and expectation of secur-
ity.172 In fact, Professor Berger claims that these assumptions remain
valid regardless of ownership by the occupant.173 Professor Berger
notes that "[p]olitical discourse naturally complements the medley of
ongoing activity within the marketplace" and suggests defining "the
modem public forum not in terms of ownership but rather as a gather-
ing place, which joins those who wish to deliver a political message to
those who-at the least--do not think it strange to find the forum to
be the delivery point."1 74
Professor Berger is motivated not by an interest in clarifying the
public forum doctrine, but by a desire to expand the reach of
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.175 Nonetheless, his functional
analysis of the special qualities of the public forum can still prove
helpful in analyzing the public forum doctrine.
(4) Dean Farber: "Public Choice" Theory and the First Amendment
Recent analyses, founded in modem constitutional theories, can
help buttress these functional descriptions of the special position of
the public forum. For example, Dean Daniel Farber, a proponent of
172. ld. at 652-54.
173. Id. at 654. Berger states that "[l]imits on state power are even more pronounced
when the state, itself, is the landlord, as in the case of a public housing authority." Id.
174. Id. at 656.
175. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). For an example of the article's thrust, consider the following
excerpt:
For speech to flourish, expressionists need settings where they can meet their
audiences-today's dispersed and motorized citizenry-cheaply and efficiently.
Thus, when presented with evidence that vast urban galleria and suburban mul-
tiactivity malls have displaced downtown sidewalks and strip retail stores open-
ing to the sidewalk, a common-law court should stand ready to declare these
malls, and other forum-like private lands, to be appropriate, indeed vital, comple-
ments to more traditional public space.
Berger, supra note 170, at 663 (footnotes omitted); see also New Jersey Coalition Against
War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 1994 WL 708997, at *20 (NJ. Dec. 20,
1994) ("[W]here private ownership of property that is the functional counterpart of the
downtown business district has effectively manipulated significant opportunities for free
speech, the owners cannot eradicate those opportunities by prohibiting it.").
January 1995] THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
"public choice" theory,176 has applied the theory to the First
Amendment. 177
By applying an economic argument to the political process, Dean
Farber notes that "information is especially vulnerable in the political
process precisely because it has the attributes of a public good."'1 78
Dean Farber describes one market defect as the "uniquely reproduci-
ble" nature of information. 79 He explains that because information
can be reproduced so cheaply, many information consumers will not
compensate the original producer, and, therefore, the market will
under-produce information. 80 Consequently, those producers will
not lobby as effectively as other producers of consumer goods, and
"the political system is likely to overregulate information."'18 1 Thus,
Dean Farber concludes that First Amendment doctrine can be ex-
plained as an attempt to better capture the social value of information
as a public good.182
Dean Farber argues that the more information resembles a public
good, the more First Amendment protection it has received. For ex-
ample, political speech "most strongly exhibits the qualities of a public
good" because political participation suffers from inherent free rider
problems. 183 Coupled with the potential conflict of interest felt by
politicians who consider suppressing speech, the "double" public good
quality of political speech provides ample justification for the protec-
tion afforded by the courts.184 On the other hand, speech in which
benefits accrue more directly to the listener and, thus, more closely
resembles a consumer good, like pornography and most commercial
speech, will receive less First Amendment protection. 185
Under this analysis, speech in the public forum deserves special
protection as well. Dean Farber describes the public forum doctrine
176. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCrION (1991) (considering how economic principles can illu-
minate public law).
177. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991) (explaining the economics of the First
Amendment).
178. Id. at 556.
179. Id. at 559.
180. Id. at 559-60.
181. Id. at 560-61.
182. Id. at 555.
183. Id. at 562-63.
184. Id. at 562-64.
185. Id. at 565-66 ("Most of the benefit of product advertising is captured by the pro-
ducer itself in the form of increased sales. Consequently, we would not expect severe un-
derproduction of commercial speech.") (footnotes omitted).
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in the context of a set of doctrinal protections (understood here as
subsidies) for speech, including the public official doctrine, announced
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,186 and a suggested narrow con-
struction rule, contrary to the one used in Rust v. Sullivan,187 for fund-
ing restrictions on speech.1t Dean Farber describes the use of the
public forum as subsidizing speakers by "giving speakers free use of
certain government facilities" and the role of public forum doctrine as
"prevent[ing] the government from discriminating in providing this
subsidy."' 8 9 In Dean Farber's analysis, "speakers should be able to
use government property as long as they do not impose an undue cost
on the government."' 90 Even though alternate channels may be open
in our country, public forums remain important to Dean Farber be-
cause they "are often the only place where less affluent groups and
individuals can effectively express their message."' 91
(5) David Yassky: Dualist Democracy and the First Amendment
In another analysis, David Yassky has applied Professor Bruce
Ackerman's "dualist democracy" theory' 92 to the First Amend-
ment.193 Under Professor Ackerman's theory, democracy is carried
on at two levels: ordinary politics and "higher lawmaking." 94 Ordi-
nary elections occupy a limited role in American political life. They
specifically do not give American politicians a mandate to overturn
special "higher lawmaking" decisions of the people. 195 "Higher law-
making" occurs infrequently and under special conditions, but it earns
the enhanced legitimacy that protects its considered judgments against
186. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
187. 500 U.S. 173, 184-87 (1991).
188. Farber, supra note 177, at 568-74.
189. Id. at 574 ("Otherwise, [unpopular] speakers would have to incur the cost of ob-
taining a forum for their speech.").
190. Id. at 574. Farber notes that this approach has so far been rejected by the Court.
Id. See Post, supra note 164, at 1765 & n.213 ("What has truly bewildered most commenta-
tors about modem public forum doctrine is that the Court has continually repudiated the
test focusing on [whether the speech activities would be incompatible with the use to which
the premises are dedicated] despite what commentators view as its obvious superiority.");
cf Saphire, supra note 156, at 763 ("But if the public forum doctrine has provided a rea-
sonably stable framework for achieving a reasonably tolerable accommodation of first
amendment and non-first amendment values-and I think a plausible argument can be
made that it has-the Court's continued adherence to it may not be unwarranted.").
191. Farber, supra note 177, at 574 n.86.
192. See generally, BRUcE AcKEmAxN, WE THm PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
193. David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1699 (1991).
194. AcK ~mAN, supra note 192, at 6.
195. Id. at 6.
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ordinary politics. 196 Professor Ackerman locates these periods of
higher lawmaking at three points in America's constitutional history:
the Founding, the post-Civil War amendments, and the New Deal.
197
In reviewing the history of the First Amendment in light of Ack-
erman's theory, Yassky argues that
[w]hile today's First Amendment stands for something very differ-
ent from what the Founders envisioned, the change was produced
not by an increasing societal belief in the value of free speech, but
by two watershed transformations in American government-the
Civil War and the New Deal-that remade the entire constitutional
framework. 198
Coincidentally, Yassky's examples highlight early developments in the
public forum doctrine. For example, he highlights the early case that
most clearly rejected the public forum doctrine, Davis v. Massachu-
setts.199 Yassky argues that in upholding an ordinance that banned
addresses on public grounds (there, the Boston Common), the Davis
decision actually fell neatly at the intersection of the "two themes of
post-Civil War liberty jurisprudence-inviolable property rights and
devalued speech rights. 200 With the advent of the New Deal, Yassky
argues, the Court balanced the broadened powers of the government
by "invigorat[ing] the Bill of Rights' non-economic guarantees of per-
sonal freedom-most energetically, the speech and press clauses of
the First Amendment. '2 01 To symbolize this "complete reversal of
values," Yassky draws on two of the cases already highlighted in this
Article: Hague v. CIO,202 the conceptual starting point for public fo-
rum analysis, and Marsh v. Alabama,20 3 an early decision that found
state action on private property. Thus, for Yassky, the public forum
doctrine that developed between Davis and Hague is one symbol of
the intervening period of "higher lawmaking.' ' 2°4 After discussing
what he calls the other marker of the new era, United States v.
Carolene Products Co., and its famous footnote,20 5 Yassky asserts
"that the Court's focus on free speech is a direct consequence of the
196. Id.
197. Id. at 40 (describing the "shape of the constitutional past").
198. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1701.
199. 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897). Cf. Post, supra note 164, at 1764 (noting that "no one
on the modem Court has explicitly defended the extreme perspective associated with the
major premise of the Davis syllogism").
200. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1729.
201. Id. at 1730.
202. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion); see supra note 111.
203. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
204. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1731-34.
205. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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New Deal repudiation of property rights as an avenue for fulfilling
constitutional commitments to individual liberty." 2o6
Yassky does not merely dwell on the past. He describes the cur-
rent post-New Deal task of the Court as much more difficult than the
ones faced previously:
For the first time, the constitutional liberty guarantee depends not
on a ready-made body of doctrine-the common law-but on rights
developed and articulated by the federal courts themselves. The
courts have had to fill in, more or less from scratch, the blanks in
the general constitutional command to protect political liberties....
To determine the constitutionality of a statute, it is no longer suffi-
cient simply to decide whether the state or the federal government
is the appropriate decision-maker in a particular policy area (the
Federalist-era calculus), nor to compare the statute with long-estab-
lished common law rights (the post-Civil War calculus). Instead, to
vindicate the Constitution's commitment to individual liberty, the
courts have been required actively to elaborate a comprehensive set
of judicially-enforced guarantees.20 7
He argues that in its current elaboration the Court has "create[d] a
libertarian sphere modeled on [the Court's] earlier instantiation of
constitutional liberty principles. ' 208 Yassky further notes that
[s]imply owning property does not give rise to a First Amendment
right to deny its use to others, even when the use is for others'
speech. For a First Amendment right to obtain, the property must
be characterized as a speech resource....
... Just as Lochner did for property, Pacific Gas [475 U.S. 1
(1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)] and PruneYard [447 U.S. 74
(1980)] enshrine private orderings of speech resources. These pri-
vate orderings are assumed to be legitimate and beyond the reach of
state intervention. 20 9
Yassky goes on to develop these ideas in the context of Buckley v.
Valeo210 and concludes that the Court's underlying premise "is that
there is a 'natural' political process which, if left untouched, cannot be
deficient."21'
Although Yassky does not address the current public forum doc-
trine, one could apply this method of trying to actively develop a com-
prehensive set of judicially enforced guarantees to protect political
206. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1733-34.
207. Id at 1738.
208. Id. at 1738-39.
209. Id. at 1741.
210. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[Tihe concept that government may re-
strict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ...
211. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1741.
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liberties. Where Yassky noted that "[e]nhanced judicial attention to
the political process [is] necessary to counter the threat of administra-
tive tyranny,"12 12 Yassky might find administrative tyranny present in
governmental control over those places where a member of the gen-
eral public might not expect such controls, like a park or a street.
For locations with less firm traditions, Yassky might try to charac-
terize certain property as a speech resource owned by the govern-
ment. Presumably in this area, like in PruneYard, the critical
determinant would be the characterization of the property by the gov-
ernment. The political process would be presumed to operate prop-
erly, and the Court would allow that process to characterize the
property. Perhaps the Court would recognize that allowing the gov-
ernmental entity to characterize the property for a specific case would
encourage distortions and abuse. As such, a court might attempt to
find more "objective" methods of governmental characterization, like
documented "intent. ' 213 Although this formulation of the public fo-
rum doctrine is not particularly expansive, it certainly represents a
step from the view of total proprietary control underlying Davis. 214
Many First Amendment values are particularly well-served by
protecting speech in public forums. This view remains true under a
variety of theories, from traditionally styled ones (for example, Pro-
fessor Saphire's defense of formalism, Professor Post's reformulation
of the public forum doctrine as the distinction between governance
and management, or Professor Berger's functional analysis of the pub-
212. Id. at 1736.
213. Cf. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706
(1992) (articulating an "intent"-based test); see also supra notes 125-133 and accompanying
text.
214. Moreover, in his final pages, Yassky boldly encourages the development of a new
jurisprudence of the First Amendment: "In a political environment dominated by mon-
eyed interests, genuinely pluralistic debate requires the government to go beyond laissez-
faire. Rather than seeking to prohibit government intervention, First Amendment juris-
prudence should acknowledge the pervasiveness of government 'action' and forthrightly
address the real moral issues at stake." Yassky, supra note 193, at 1752. Considering the
work of the critical legal studies movement and Professor Catherine MacKinnon, Yassky
finds a parallel in the legal realist movement and suggests that
[t]he contemporary attraction of indeterminacy may similarly be driven by a
growing realization among legal scholars that the Court's assumptions about the
fairness of the political process and the legitimacy of political resource distribu-
tions are unfounded. As it becomes clear that particular legal regimes benefit
some and harm others, the essence of the legal craft may itself seem tainted.
Yassky, supra note 193, at 1754 & n.201 (footnote omitted). Undoubtedly, upon a judicial
willingness to take note of inequities in political resource distributions, the public forum
doctrine could take on even greater significance because public forums are so frequently
the only place where the less affluent can convey their messages.
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lic forum) to more holistic approaches (for example, Dean Farber's
public choice theory or Ackerman's dual democracy theory as inter-
preted by Yassky). Certainly, not all government property is appro-
priate as a public forum, and different theories suggest a varied scope
for the doctrine. Nevertheless, the resilient value of the public forum
concept, though sometimes criticized as wooden in doctrinal form or
manipulable in application, should inspire a court to find some means
to make use of it on the Nil. A more theoretical or functional analysis
may be especially appropriate in applying law to new technology
when the reliable signposts of tradition are absent.
B. A Simplistic Public Forum Doctrine on the Nil: Who Wants It?
Having articulated theories of the underlying functional and the-
oretical justifications for the public forum doctrine, this Section ex-
plores whether a simplistic application of the doctrine to networks
that compose the NIl, as attempted in Part II, would animate those
justifications. This Section concludes that while some forums on the
Nil should appropriately be treated as public, others should be
treated as nonpublic. Taken as a whole, the NII should not be seen as
a public or a nonpublic forum, but as a more complex entity, like a
city, that contains both public and nonpublic forums within it.
(1) The Health Care Conference: A True Public Forum on the Nil
Recall the health care conference described earlier: it was organ-
ized on a government system on which resources were offered at no
charge to the public and it was open to all and dedicated to a discus-
sion of health care issues.215 Although the President may wish that
critics in this conference were of a different mind (or at least less artic-
ulate), this forum seems like a prime example of one that should be
fully protected by the public forum doctrine. After all, if the Presi-
dent were to attempt to censor the conference, under the straightfor-
ward doctrine, state action restricting speech would be present.216
Even under the most restrictive test for non-traditional public forum
status-the intent test-there should be ample evidence that the gov-
ernment intended to open up its property for use as a public forum for
health care issues.217
Under the various functional and theoretical justifications as well,
this conference ought to be considered a public forum. Under Profes-
215. See discussion supra Part I(C)(3).
216. See discussion supra Part 11(A).
217. See discussion supra Part H1(B).
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sor Post's methodology, the President is acting in a governance capac-
ity by trying to influence the will of the people outside the
governmental organization, rather than by managing internal af-
fairs.2 18 Professor Berger would categorize this as a public forum be-
cause messages in this conference are not sent with an expectation of
privacy, anyone may enter at no cost, and territory is not reserved for
anyone.2 19 Under Dean Farber's analysis, speech so broadly directed
as in this debate is likely to be undervalued since its value is so diffuse.
Further, since this might be an example of the political process under-
valuing such speech, it underscores the important role of the public
forum doctrine in protecting the voice of the "little people" against
the political enterprise.220 Finally, Yassky's historical view of the ex-
panding role of the administrative state would highlight the impor-
tance of this state-created forum for public discussion-which by its
very size and domination may have diminished the importance of
other forums and made protection of speech here that much more
critical.22
This scenario may seem farfetched to those inexperienced on the
Internet. However, Internet discussion groups are often prime exam-
ples of debates that are uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and they
frequently take place on computers owned by the government or state
universities. Moreover, governments from Massachusetts to Washing-
ton, D.C. have expressed interest in using the electronic forum as a
substratum for political debate.222 The electronic public forum is com-
ing soon, and the public forum doctrine should be used to protect it.a2
3
218. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text. Post, supra note 164, at 1828,
remarks:
If members of the public are performing what we would characterize as specifi-
cally organizational roles, the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is not
triggered. The prohibition will bite, on the other hand, if ... institutional re-
sources are made available for speech that is not seen as intrinsic to an internal
institutional function.
219. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text, especially Berger, supra note 170,
at 655. Factors such as quiet or security would seem inapposite in this context, although
some people refer to heated discussions as "noisy" or "flaming." Sproull & Kiesler, supra
note 35, at 339.
220. See supra notes 176-191 and accompanying text, especially Farber, supra note 177,
at 564, 574.
221. See supra notes 192-214 and accompanying text, especially Yassky, supra note 193,
at 1736 (discussing, inter alia, "the threat of administrative tyranny").
222. See sources cited supra note 51.
223. What about messages sent to this forum that do not have to do with health care
directly, such as a message discussing the impact of the budget deficit on health care?
Could a moderator delete those, consistent with public forum use? For now, I would sug-
gest that a moderator should be allowed some discretion in deleting irrelevant messages,
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(2) A Nonpublic Forum on the Nil: An Example
Every exchange of messages on the NI cannot be considered to
take place within a public forum. Such a presumption would fit poorly
into the public forum doctrine,22 4 and an example will illustrate the
practical and the theoretical difficulties of holding such a position.
Recall the Cronies conference example: A city mayor maintains
a conference on one of the city systems of his cabinet members,
trusted advisees, and a few city business leaders from the mayor's
party.'2 5 All messages in the conference are sent with the approval of
the mayor's office. Imagine that a city business leader, not from the
mayor's party, requests membership in the conference and is rejected
by the mayor.
This scenario would not seem to implicate either the public forum
doctrine or its underlying values. On a doctrinal level, state action
may be involved in refusing membership,2 6 but the forum has never
been designated as public and was never intended to be considered
public by the mayor.22 7 This scenario loosely parallels the paper mail
system found to be a nonpublic forum in Perry.2
2 8
Moreover, treating every government-controlled conference as
though it were a designated public forum would do violence to the
analysis of the public forum on both a functional and a theoretical
level. Professor Post's analysis of the distinction between governance
and management would apply directly: the role of the mayor here is
to manage and receive advice from trusted advisors, not to barrage
them with messages from all comers or share their messages with the
public. 22 9 In considering Professor Berger's factors, messages from
the mayor on this restricted conference would normally entail an ex-
pectation of privacy and focused entry primarily by the mayor. The
conference would also involve relatively direct associations and com-
munications tailored to those associations. Thus, personal messages
even in a public forum, as inconsistent with the "manner" of the forum, although such
moderation of a conference should not be permitted to modify its "purpose." See discus-
sion infra Part m1I(C)(2)(a).
224. See discussion supra Part 11(B).
225. See discussion supra Part I(C)(2).
226. See discussion supra Part HI(A).
227. See discussion supra Part I(C)(2).
228. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47-49 (1983).
229. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text; Post, supra note 164, at 1782
("When acting with managerial authority, a government institution may to a significant
degree control speech as necessary to attain its legitimate organizational goals, as these
goals are understood by a court."); cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)
(upholding confidentiality for communications among high government officials).
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are more "home-like" than "marketplace-like. '230 Dean Farber prob-
ably would argue that messages from the mayor and messages sent to
this tightly knit conference have a relatively direct impact upon the
recipients and that the third party's right to speak is less in need of
protection by the First Amendment than if it were generating general
public messages.231 Finally, Yassky might argue that this small-scale
operation is not an example of the adninistrative state's special capac-
ity for tyranny; rather, he would probably expect a court to view the
political process as working and the resulting ordering of speech as
"natural." 232
Thus, the notion of the NII as a public forum in all its aspects is
contrary not only to existing doctrine but also to the values informing
that doctrine, at least in the context of the Cronies conference. Basi-
cally, this analysis confirms the result of Part II: Not only will net-
works on the NII not be considered public forums, but there is no
justification for treating them as public forums generally.
(3) The Nil as Forums: More like a City than like an Airport Terminal or
a Park
Taken as a whole, the relationship between the NII and the public
forum doctrine is complex. In some situations, structures on the NII
seem worthy of full public forum protection. In others, public forum
intervention would do violence to the doctrinal principles as currently
understood. This analysis derives its complexity from the underlying
subject matter. In fact, the NII encompasses too much variety to dis-
cuss coherently whether the entire Nil, or even its physical networks,
should be considered a public forum. The opening of the NII is not
like the opening of a new park. It is much more vast and complicated,
230. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text, especially Berger, supra note 170,
at 653-54 ("right to exclude").
231. See supra notes 176-191 and accompanying text, especially Farber, supra note 177,
at 565 (arguing that because "[m]ost of the benefit of product advertising is captured by the
producer itself[,J . .. we would not expect severe underproduction of commercial
speech").
232. See supra notes 192-214 and accompanying text, especially Yassky, supra note 193,
at 1736, 1742 ("[T]he post-New Deal Court took up the challenge of countering the danger
to liberty posed by the administrative state," but "[o]nly when disparities in political power
can be traced to state 'intervention' is further, remedial intervention constitutional."). To
the extent that Yassky's intuitions about some future Court questioning "the fairness of the
political process and the legitimacy of political resource distributions," Yassky, supra note
193, at 1754, such questioning would result in only limited free speech rights in particular
circumstances for the third party in the suggested scenarios, rather than the more general
right that would be found in a public forum.
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like the opening of a new city or university.Z33 Thus, an analysis that
breaks down this great development into smaller units will be helpful.
C. Selective Application of Public Forum Values Within the NIl
This Section of the Article begins the analysis of breaking down
the NI into smaller, more constitutionally relevant units, and suggests
the constitutional relevance of those units within the framework of the
public forum doctrine.
This Section suggests, as a basic definition, that a forum on the
NIH should be treated as a public forum if the following criteria are
met: (1) it is owned or controlled by the government; (2) it is not
operated at a profit; (3) it has unrestricted access for recipients of fo-
rum messages; and (4) it affords viewpoint-neutral access to a reason-
ably large number of senders. Classifying a forum, though important,
merely identifies the proper light by which restrictions on that forum
should be examined. Therefore, this Section addresses four specific
issues that surely will arise for forums on the Nil: topic dedication,
forum membership, forum cost, and forum closure.
(1) Finding Landmarks on the NII for Public Forum Analysis
The specific examples of forums on the NII suggested above
4
involved clear cases of governmental control. In order to simplify the
First Amendment analysis and to focus on those areas in which regu-
lation is likely to be most prolific, invasive, and effectively enforced,
this Article has tried to focus on state-controlled areas and the regula-
tion of those areas by the state as owner or controller, 5
This Section focuses on conferences as a primary model for elec-
tronic communication, with an expectation that the principles devel-
oped may help shed light on the appropriate treatment of other modes
233. Perhaps the language here is too strong. Even a park is complex, including fields,
playgrounds, equipment sheds, etc. While parks are usually taken as the model traditional
public forum, it seems unlikely that if pressed the Court would hold an equipment shed to
be a public forum merely because it was found in a park. The issue of delineating exactly
how far public forum status extends has not been specifically addressed. See, e.g., Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (finding a classroom to be a limited public forum
but noting that "[w]e have not held, for example, that ... a university must grant free
access to all of its grounds or buildings."); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) ("A public forum may be created for a limited purpose
such as use by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.") (citations omit-
ted). In the case of this vast new technology with its transformative potential, though, such
delineation will be critical.
234. See discussion supra Sections II(B)(1), III(B)(2).
235. See discussion supra Section I(B).
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of discussion. Focusing on the conferences rather than on the entire
network is sensible because the participants experience the discus-
sions within the former context. The participants in Wendy's Politics
conference may well be unaware of the existence of the mayor's Cro-
nies conference, and vice versa.236 The Supreme Court addressed the
issue of identifying the relevant forum for public forum analysis in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund.237 In deciding
whether one legal defense fund should have access to a federal charity
drive, the Court could have chosen to define the relevant forum as the
federal workplace or as the network that implemented the charity
drive.238 Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor stated:
Forum analysis is not completed merely by identifying the govern-
ment property at issue. Rather, in defining the forum we have fo-
cused on the access sought by the speaker. When speakers seek
general access to public property, the forum encompasses that prop-
erty. In cases in which limited access is sought, our cases have taken
a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum
within the confines of government property.
239
Thus, the plurality held that because access was sought only to the
charity drive, the relevant forum for that case was only the charity
drive, not the entire workplace.240
The Court has taken this tailored approach in other public forum
cases as well, such as defining the forum to be the school newspaper
rather than the public school;241 the school mail network rather than
the public school;242 the university meeting facilities rather than the
entire state university;243 and the advertising spaces on city-owned
buses rather than entire buses.244 Therefore, a court should take a
tailored approach to high-tech forums as well and select particular
conferences for analysis rather than the entire network-especially
236. See discussion supra Section I(C)(2).
237. 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (plurality opinion).
238. Id. at 800.
239. Id. at 801 (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 801.
241. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1988).
242. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983).
243. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 & n.5 (1981) ("We have not held, for
example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or
buildings.").
244. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974).
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since the initial access to the networks of the NI seems well protected
by political considerations.245
A first inquiry should be what it means for a forum to be desig-
nated "government-owned." After all, the speech in the case of a con-
ference would consist of messages; the actual messages could be
dispersed among the recipients and stored on their own systems rather
than on the government's. Undue emphasis on the end location of the
messages themselves would be misleading.246 Such an emphasis
would divert attention from the forum-like aspects of the conference
because each of those messages alone would not seem to constitute a
public forum. Rather, it is the set of messages over time, reliably sent
to all recipients who choose to take part in the dialogue, that creates
the forum-like aspects to the conference. Thus, the critical element is
the mechanism that implements the conference itself, that is, the con-
trol over the senders, the recipients and the collateral information
about the conference. The mechanism for implementing the confer-
ence typically will have a physical location,2 7 as well as an identifiable
group of people who may exercise control over it. Both location and
powers of control could be used in electronic property law to deter-
mine ownership. In the absence of contract, location of the confer-
ence may be the simplest indicator of property.24s
Discussion here will begin with the clearest case of electronic fo-
rums that should be seen as government property: those that are both
stored on government machines and managed by government offi-
cials.249 Once a conference or other forum is identified as government
property, the next critical inquiry, assuming it would not be classified
245. See INFORMAION INFsrRucruRE TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 3 (describing
second of nine principles as extending the "universal service" concept "to ensure that in-
formation resources are available to all at affordable prices").
246. See ag., supra note 50.
247. Some recipients of conferences are on other conferences on other computers.
Thus, a "master" conference could be located on a government computer, and a
"subordinate" conference could be located on a private computer or vice versa. Other
mailing list technologies, exemplified by Usenet or Hypertext systems, would raise other
complex issues of virtual location.
248. Still, thorny issues abound. Consider a mailing list located on a private computer
that can be controlled by any member of a committee, among whom are two government
officials, sitting in their government roles. Should the presence of potential control by the
two governmental committee members make the mailing list government property? What
if the other members of the committee drop out, leaving only the governmental members
controlling this mailing list?
249. For conferences on government systems controlled by private parties, see infra
notes 275-280 and accompanying text.
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as a traditional public forum,250 entails determining its status as a des-
ignated public forum or a nonpublic forum. This inquiry usually fo-
cuses on "governmental intent."'251 Especially in this context, that
simple definition seems either too narrow or too broad. If intent
means "intent to create a public forum," the definition suffers from
subjective circularity;252 if intent means "intent to transmit informa-
tion to the public," then the definition is probably too broad because a
major use of the entire NII will be transmitting information to the
public and it seems inappropriate to make every governmental use
subject to the scrutiny reserved for public forums. Moreover, subjec-
tive government intent may not be well documented for every confer-
ence. Therefore, a course of conduct analysis may be critical to the
designation of public forum status.
Factors can be identified that suggest an "objective intent." In
fact, Professor Saphire has noted that objective factors play a critical
role in the Court's public forum jurisprudence.253 Factors could in-
clude the groups of people permitted to participate in the forum as
senders or recipients (participation factors), and the monetary cost of
participation. Even assuming that the participation was free, neither
of the participation factors could independently indicate the requisite
clear intent to create a "public forum." For example, if anyone could
send messages to one forum, that access alone should not trigger pub-
lic forum status because a limited recipient pool could indicate some-
thing more prosaic than a public forum, like a questionnaire or tax
filing.254 Likewise, if recipient status were unregulated, that openness
alone should not trigger public forum status because a limited sender
pool could indicate a different kind of function, such as a press release
mechanism or other informational mechanism. 25
5
250. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
251. See discussion supra Section II(B), especially notes 125-133 and accompanying
text.
252. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
253. Saphire, supra note 156, at 763-64:
[T]he integrity of the public forum doctrine depends, in large part, on its
capacity to provide a reasonably clear guide to first amendment decisionmakers,
including judges, public officials and citizens. At a minimum, this requires rea-
sonable clarity in the articulation of criteria for classifying various fora and the
standards of review applicable in each type of forum. These criteria and stan-
dards should be amenable to reasonably consistent application.
254. Peter H. Lewis, IRS Tries On-Line Tax Filing. N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at 37; see
also sources cited supra note 30.
255. Peter H. Lewis, Internet Users Get Access To S.E.C. Filings Fee-Free, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1994, at D2; see also Farrell, supra note 51 (describing Senator Kennedy's use of
the Internet to post press releases and public remarks).
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Should open enrollment for both senders and recipients be re-
quired for a finding of a public forum? Both kinds of open enrollment
seem constitutionally required in order to find a designated public fo-
rum-though such openness was not sufficient in some cases.256 On
the NII, however, such provisions should be sufficient as participation
factors. 257 If open enrollment on a free conference were granted to
both senders and recipients, it is hard to imagine what purpose would
be served other than the provision of a public forum-at least without
specific designation to the contrary. Moreover, the physical public fo-
rums are naturally limited to a finite number of participants whereas
electronic forums are potentially available to tremendous numbers of
participants. An electronic forum that allows all participants to speak
simultaneously will only create confusion. Therefore, open enroll-
ment to unlimited senders should not be required for a finding of a
public forum, especially if the limitation imposed on enrollment for
senders appears viewpoint-neutral (e.g., limited to a specific (large)
number of speakers). Such a limitation would only explicitly mirror
the implicit limitations of physical public forums.
With regard to cost, the inquiry should be limited to determining
whether the conference is a commercial enterprise, like the inquiry
regarding the airport terminals in Lee.258 Because licensing fees are
commonplace even for some traditional public forums,. 59 the exist-
ence of fees in and of themselves should not conclusively brand a fo-
rum nonpublic. Rather, the Court in Lee pointed to the user fees as
primary funding sources for the terminals and the legally regulated
profit to which the terminals were entitled as indicia of commercial-
ity.260 Likewise, a conference on the NII that is government-subsi-
dized or not operated to make a profit should not be deemed
commercial for purposes of determining the public forum status to be
applied.261
256. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706
(1992) (holding that airport terminals are not public fora); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
836-37 (1976) (holding that free access by the public to part of a military base did not
convert that part into a public forum).
257. The NI's promise of "universal access," when implemented, will probably be crit-
ical to a judicial finding of true "open enrollment." INFORMATION INFRAsTRucruPE TASK
FORCa, supra note 1, at 3.
258. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2707.
259. See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speeck User Fees and Insurance in the Market-
place of Ideas, 74 GEo. LJ. 257, 285, 347 (1985); see also Goldberger, supra note 162.
260. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2707.
261. Although a conference could be treated as a designated public forum while charg-
ing fees, this would not mean any fee structure rendering the forum noncommercial would
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In summary, one tentative basic definition of a public forum on
the NII is a forum that: (1) is owned or controlled by the government;
(2) is operated in a non-profit manner; (3) provides unrestricted ac-
cess for message recipients, and (4) has viewpoint-neutral access to a
reasonably large number of message senders. Such a scheme would
certainly meet Professor Saphire's measure of the "reasonable clarity"
necessary to insure the public forum doctrine's "integrity" and "rea-
sonably consistent application. '262
Can such a rigid scheme respond to deeper understandings about
the public forum? Despite the oft-expressed skepticism about the sig-
nificance of the public/private distinction,263 analyses of the views of
the four commentators (besides Professor Saphire) who have illu-
mined the earlier discussion of the role of the public forum may be
helpful.
Professor Post would see the important element of such a forum
to be its openness to people outside the government.264 Professor
Berger would point to similarities such a forum is likely to share with
a marketplace: allowing anyone to read messages means senders have
no privacy; allowing anyone to join is analogous to having many en-
tryways, and invites many messages (i.e., much noise).265 Dean Farber
would particularly stress the open nature of the audience and suspect
that people sending messages at the low charges of a nonprofit to such
a broad audience cannot be adequately compensated by the mar-
ket.266 Given the viewpoint-neutral admission, Yassky might find a
critical political "process by which citizens exercise control over the
comport with designated public forum restrictions. For example, a conference that charged
a small licensing fee could be considered noncommercial and a designated public forum,
but differences in that licensing fee based on party affiliation would surely violate public
forum standards. See discussion infra Section III(C)(2)(c).
262. Saphire, supra note 156, at 763-64.
263. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 65, at 1357 (1982) ("[O]ne simply loses one's ability
to take the public/private distinction seriously as a description, as an explanation, or as a
justification of anything.").
264. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text, especially Post, supra note 164, at
1833 ("When the state acts to govern the speech of the general public ..... the first amend-
ment imposes rather stringent restrictions .... ").
265. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text, especially Berger, supra note 170,
at 655. A forum with no entry fee would also parallel the idealized Bergerian marketplace.
266. See supra notes 176-191 and accompanying text, especially Farber, supra note 177,
at 563 ("To the extent that voters seek information about foreign affairs,.., they can often
obtain it without paying the original producer.").
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state."267 If faced with legislation restricting this process, the Court
might apply "'more exacting judicial scrutiny.' ' 268
Admittedly, such rigid criteria seem to lack the flexibility courts
have found in separating the public and private spheres for constitu-
tional purposes. As Professor Seidman noted, "Instead of offering
reconciliation, constitutional law allows us to live with contradiction
by establishing a shifting, uncertain, and contested boundary between
distinct public and private spheres within which conflicting values can
be separately nurtured. '269 Professor Seidman describes three dilem-
mas that characterize modem constitutional debate: universalist vs.
particularist values; government intervention vs. libertarianism; and
openness vs. secrecy.270
In fact, the views of the commentators studied in this Article can
be naturally associated with the three subsidiary distinctions that Pro-
fessor Seidman makes concerning the meanings of "public" and "pri-
vate." Professor Post's analysis can be seen as a response to Professor
Seidman's first distinction, the one between universalism and particu-
larism.271 Yassky responds to some of the issues raised by Professor
Seidman's distinction between interventionism and libertarianism.272
267. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1737.
268. Id. at 1737; see also supra notes 192-214 and accompanying text.
269. Seidman, supra note 16, at 1007. See also Seidman, supra note 16, at 1047:
Judicial enforcement of constitutional rights can best be understood as our soci-
ety's imperfect effort to deal with the boundary problem, particularly in the pub-
lic/private context. Courts are suited to play a mediating role between public and
private spheres because they are the most private of our public institutions....
... [T]o the extent that judicial review matters, it matters because of institu-
tional arrangements that encourage judges to be in touch with both universalist
and particularist values.
270. Seidman, supra note 16, at 1007.
271. ld. at 1019-23 (discussing the tensions in the distinction and, inter alia, defining
universalism as "an insistence that we treat all members of an expansively bounded com-
munity with equal concern and respect") (id at 1019); cf Post, supra note 164, at 1782
(noting, in reformulating public forum doctrine, that "[w]hen the state acts to govern the
speech of the general public, it is subject to the restrictions of what we would ordinarily
think of as the 'usual' principles of first amendment adjudication").
272. See Seidman, supra note 16, at 1023-26:
Precisely because government intervention must keep a universalist orientation,
some limit on that intervention is necessary .... The ideal of a "public" govern-
ment necessarily entails its opposite: a "private" sphere, protected from public
intervention, within which people are free to form individualized relationships
that cannot be justified under the requirements of impersonal beneficence.
Cf. Yassky, supra note 193, at 1736 ("Indeed, the unabashed activism of the post-New Deal
federal government made a sphere of individual liberty all the more important. Instead of
abandoning the liberty principle of the Bill of Rights, the post-New Deal Court took up the
challenge of countering the danger to liberty posed by the administrative state.").
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Professor Berger seems to echo parts of Professor Seidman's discus-
sion of the distinction of openness and privacy.273 To the extent that
these three categories represent three different traditions-or at least
three interlocking traditions-it seems unlikely that they, along with
Dean Farber's view, would line up to produce a set of rigid objective
criteria of the kind suggested in this Article in order to provide a defi-
nition of an electronic "public" forum. When the courts choose crite-
ria, evidence of multiple threads will likely be present. Yet, Professor
Saphire's analysis suggests that in setting the proper scope for the
public forum, there may be good reason for the courts to prefer for-
mal values to Professor Seidman's shifting, uncertain, and contested
boundaries.2
74
Now consider the more complex case of electronic forums stored
on government property but not controlled by government officials.
The health care conference example above seems prototypical.
275
Here, the mere act of opening up government systems for the creation
of conferences would not be directly inviting people to send messages
to those forums since the forums do not actually exist until private
individuals create them by use of the government's facility.276 Thus,
the conferences created are not necessarily public forums. In the Poli-
tics conference example,277 if Wendy used a government system to
273. See Seidman, supra note 16, at 1026-29 ("Thus, businesses that open themselves to
the public are sometimes treated as government entities subject to universalist constraints
for constitutional purposes, [citing, inter alia, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)]
and individuals who act in public ways are said to 'waive' their Fourth Amendment rights
and 'reasonable expectation of privacy."'). Cf Berger, supra note 170, at 663:
[W]hen presented with evidence that vast urban galleria and suburban multiactiv-
ity malls have displaced downtown sidewalks and strip retail stores opening to the
sidewalk, a common-law court should stand ready to declare these malls, and
other forum-like private lands, to be appropriate, indeed vital, complements to
more traditional public space.
274. See, e.g., supra notes 156-162 and 253 and accompanying text.
275. See discussion supra Section I(C)(3).
276. The facility on the government-owned system that people could use to create their
own conferences would itself seem to qualify as a limited public forum as long as it satisfies
requirements analogous to those for the conferences themselves: the facility is not com-
mercial; it is available to conference creators on a content-neutral basis; it can create con-
ferences available on a viewpoint-neutral basis to a large number of senders; and it can
create conferences available on an unlimited basis to recipients. If the conference creation
facility were so classified, there could be interesting constitutional effects on treatment of
privately controlled government-provided public conferences. For example, the First
Amendment might restrict the government in its regulation of these forums. See discussion
infra Section III(C)(2)(a). Another result of this classification is that the list of forums
created by this facility could constitutionally be made publicly available. See discussion
infra Section III(C)(2)(b).
277. See discussion supra Section I(C)(2).
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create a list of her friends, even if the government were providing the
service for free, it probably would not violate the First Amendment
for her to select which friends she wants included as speakers or recip-
ients based on viewpoint. Such action would be no different from a
state university student group selecting which speakers it chooses to
invite to campus, 278 a sorority selecting which women may attend its
events on state university property, or a demonstration in a street that
included speakers from a particular political perspective. In each of
these instances, the government is providing the property and the pri-
vate individuals are providing the speech on a restricted basis. How-
ever, if a person used the government system to create a forum like
the one in the health care conference example that fit into the criteria
discussed for government controlled forums-a noncommercial entity
with unlimited availability to recipients and viewpoint-neutral availa-
bility to senders-then, under the analysis above, he or she has proba-
bly created a privately controlled public forum.279 In light of the role
of the government in enabling the NII, if the forum took on govern-
ment functions, and especially if the individual used the forum in a
discriminatory way, a court reviewing her actions may be willing to
treat him or her as a state actor for constitutional purposes.280
(2) The Constitutional Relevance of Public Forum Landmarks on the Nl
In light of this involved attempt to sketch a taxonomy of elec-
tronic forums, it would be helpful to describe the importance of cate-
gorizing a forum as public or nonpublic in an electronic context. A
few issues seem apparent, even from this vantage point and can be
arranged into four groups: topic dedication, forum membership, fo-
rum costs, and forum closure. Note that while the discussion here will
attempt to address these issues primarily for public forums, it seems
278. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) (discussing the university set-
ting and the public forum doctrine); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2148 (1993) (following Widmar in the high school context).
279. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 39, 46 n.7 (1983)
("A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups
.... "). See also Otway v. City of New York, 818 F. Supp. 659, 661-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(dismissal of action by a homosexual group to gain a right of participation in New York's
St. Patrick's Day Parade); Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group v. City of
Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1297-98 (Mass. 1994), cert granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995) (uphold-
ing right of a homosexual group to participate in Boston's St. Patrick Day parade based on
treatment of the parade, under Massachusetts statute, as a "public accommodation").
280. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421-22 (1994); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622-28 (1991).
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clear that some lesser constitutional protections for reasonable speech
would still be present in nonpublic forumsZ81
Topic Dedication. The first set of issues involves creation of con-
ferences dedicated to particular expressive purposes-as most confer-
ences are. The government itself may want to create electronic public
forums dedicated to specific issues, such as health care. If such forum
creation were permissible, should it be permissible to censor the re-
ceived messages in order that they actually discussed health care, and
not foreign policy, for example? If so, could the government have
dedicated the public forum not to debate about health care, but to
positive comments about health care and then censor out negative
comments? What changes in topic would be permissible? In short,
what could it mean, functionally, for a conference to be dedicated to a
particular topic?
Would anything change if these public forums were controlled
not by the government, but by a private entity? Conferences are fre-
quently dedicated to a discussion of particular activities that the par-
ticipants enjoy. Could the government constitutionally allow creation
of such public forums on a general basis, but prohibit ones devoted to
particular topics, e.g., smoking, sex, or racial hatred?
Forum Membership. Other issues are raised by forum member-
ship-the critical criteria that should trigger public forum status. Con-
stitutionally, to whom should the membership in an electronic
conference be available? What changes in membership structure to
the conference would be constitutionally permissible? What provi-
sions would be necessary for people who no longer wanted to receive
material sent to the conference?
Forum Costs. What prices may permissibly be charged for use of
the forum?
Forum Closure. Finally, under what conditions should the gov-
ernment or the operator of the conference be permitted to close a
conference assuming that it is a public forum?
This set of questions is intended to illustrate some of the com-
plexities involved in the creation of public forums on the NII and to
start the process of making appropriate distinctions on an unfamiliar
terrain. Unfortunately for these purposes, much of the existing litera-
ture discussing content-neutral restrictions emphasizes issues of physi-
281. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2701,
2709 (1992) (per curiam) (upholding right to leaflet in airport deemed nonpublic forum);
see also discussion supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
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cal terrain282 or the inappropriateness of the existing judicial
inquiry.28 3
a. Topic Dedication
Topic dedication is essential for the effective functioning of con-
ferences. Many conferences do not require any regulation beyond an
appropriate name, social conventions, and perhaps an explicit identity
statement in order to be dedicated to a particular topic.284 Other con-
ferences, especially ones with large numbers of senders or a history of
controversy, make use of a moderator.285 Of course, topic dedication
would appear to be a direct content-based restriction. The Court has
noted that "[a] major criterion for a valid time, place and manner re-
striction is that the restriction 'may not be based upon either the con-
tent or subject matter of speech."' 286 Professor Stone has noted that
the Court generally invalidates content-based restrictions as unconsti-
tutional, although he admits that some of these restrictions have been
upheld.287
Yet, in Perry, the Court noted that "[a] public forum may be cre-
ated for.., the discussion of certain subjects."288 Although Professor
282. Harold L. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the
Aesthetic State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 454-80 (1986)
(discussing property values, quality of the community, and visual aesthetics as state inter-
ests and scrutiny appropriate for aesthetic regulations).
283. Stone, supra note 150, at 88-99 (describing public forum doctrine as having a "my-
opic focus on formalistic labels" and noting that tradition has played "too central a role" in
the formulation of public forum doctrine).
284. Finholt & Sproull, supra note 21, at 56-57. But cf. Peter H. Lewis, An Ad (Gasp!)
in Cyberspac" Lawyer's Message Violates 'Netiquette', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at D1
(describing a lawyer sending an advertisement to more than 5,000 conferences, each dedi-
cated to a specific topic, without selecting conferences with appropriate topics).
285. For example, the author is aware of two conferences for jokes on the Internet.
One is unmoderated and is used for a wide variety of jokes. The other is for funny jokes,
and the humor is evaluated at the moderator's discretion.
286. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981) (citation omitted) (also noting that time, place, and manner restrictions must be
"'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech .... serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information') (citations omitted).
287. Stone, supra note 150, at 48 & n.6 (citing as exceptions a case involving advertising
on public transportation, a case involving zoning of sexually explicit speech, and three
cases representing "special contexts": prisons, military bases, and party affiliation require-
ments for public employment).
288. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 39, 46 n.7 (1983)
(citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student groups) and City of Madison Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school
board business)); see also Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555, 559-60
(1975) (describing two municipal theaters as "public forums designed for and dedicated to
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Post viewed this limited public forum as a "doomed concept," even he
recognized the ability, within the Constitution, for government to limit
speech in order to facilitate symbolic interaction, such as in court-
rooms and universities.289 He notes that even at town meetings, mod-
erators may constitutionally impose agendas and rules of order and
decorum.2
90
The Supreme Court has held, specifically in the context of town
meetings, that although "the participation in public discussion of pub-
lic business cannot be confined to one category of interested individu-
als[,] ... public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject
matter .... -291 One student commentator has noted that, despite
expressive activities" and holding that rejection of an application for a play production in
the theaters could be justified only if the decision were accompanied by appropriate proce-
dural safeguards).
289. Post, supra note 164, at 1756, 1799.
290. Id. at 1799. Despite Post's insistence on two categories of scrutiny of government
action-governance and management-the case of town meetings seems to me as one that
falls in between the categories he associates with governance (subject to "usual" First
Amendment principles) and management (subject to drastically reduced scrutiny). Both a
blistering attack on a government plan and an irrelevant comment should be excludable
from a town meeting under scrutiny associated with "management" functions, but neither
should be excludable under scrutiny associated with "governance" functions. Yet, in a
town meeting called to debate the plan, the former could not be excluded on the basis of its
content while the latter could be excluded.
The town meeting captures the complex position of the designated or limited public
forum. However, Post seems intent on denying its complexity. For example, in a recent
article, Post misreads White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1990). Post states
that "White reaches the correct but seemingly paradoxical conclusion that a town meeting
is not a 'public forum' for First Amendment purposes." Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mis-
take: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109,
1114 n.22 (1993). Actually, the court in White stated: "Citizens have an enormous first
amendment interest in directing speech about public issues to those who govern their city.
It is doubtless partly for this reason that such meetings, once opened, have been regarded
as public forums, albeit limited ones." 900 F.2d at 1425 (citing Madison Sch. Dist., 429 U.S.
167, 175 (1976)); Hickory Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 2653 v. City of Hickory, 656 F.2d 917,
922 (4th Cir. 1981) ("'[O]nce a [city council] meeting has been opened to the public, First
and Fourteenth Amendment protection does extend to an association whose exclusion
from speaking is predicated solely on the basis of its status as an organization of employ-
ees."') (quoting Henrico Professional Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1568 v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 649 F.2d 237,246 (4th Cir. 1981)). Although the court in White did uphold the denial
of relief for the citizen who was not permitted to speak, as an appellate court, it was facing
only a facial overbreadth challenge to an ordinance that allowed restrictions of speakers
"only when their speech disrupts, disturbs or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of the
... meeting." 900 F.2d at 1426. "So limited," the court concluded, it "cannot say that the
ordinance on its face is substantially and fatally overbroad." Id. Allowing such mainte-
nance of order is hardly a judicial conclusion that a town meeting is not a limited public
forum.
291. Madison Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175 & n.8.
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,292 a strong argument could
be made that university newspapers usually establish a designated
public forum, subject to the editorial control of the editors. 293 Like-
wise, if the government runs a bookstore or a library, it does not have
to accept any book that is donated, and it may organize the books it
owns according to their subject matter.294 As Dean Yudof has stated,
"[W]here the government's mission is to communicate and the scar-
city of resources and the nature of the enterprise make editorial selec-
tivity inevitable, the state need not tolerate or acquiesce in use of the
forum that substantially destroys the communication or editorial
processes." 295 Topic dedication in government-controlled electronic
public forums, without more (assuming speaker-neutral and view-
point-neutral moderation) should not violate the First Amendment.
296
If a topic within a public forum were itself viewpoint based, such
as a conference dedicated to "messages describing arguments in favor
of the President's health care plan," a closer First Amendment issue
might be addressed. If a message arguing against the President's
health care plan were to be rejected, a court would not be able to say,
as the Court in Rust v. Sullivan did, that "the Government has not
292. 484 U.S. 260,267-70 (1988) (holding that a public high school newspaper was not a
public forum when the paper was produced as a part of a journalism class and the teacher
had final authority over almost every aspect of the newspaper).
293. Greg C. Tenhoff, Note, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A Constitu-
tional Challenge, 64 S. CAl. L. REV. 511,527-288 (1991). Tenhoff notes that "almost all the
lower federal court cases [pre-Hazelwood] have considered a university newspaper to be a
type of public forum." Ild. at 527.
294. Steven Bercu, a colleague and former Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology, suggested this helpful example. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 870, 872 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that a public school board "rightly pos-
sess[es] significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries" although
"local school boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply because
they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.")
(quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
295. YUDOF, supra note 109, at 241.
296. The Court's recent decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (up-
holding the conditioning of Title X funds on prohibition of counseling, referral, and infor-
mation provision regarding abortion as a method of family planning) buttresses this point.
The Court held:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a pro-
gram to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without
at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on




discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund
one activity to the exclusion of the other. '' 297 The activity funded is
itself defined by viewpoint. Rust did not indicate that viewpoint fund-
ing would necessarily violate the First Amendment. To the contrary,
the Court noted that it was permissible for the government to make a
value judgment and to implement that judgment by allocating public
funds. 298 The Court's decision indicated that the First Amendment
would be violated if the government were to "'discriminate invidiously
in its subsidies in such a way as to "ai[m] at the suppression of danger-
ous ideas."' 299 Under Rust, such a suppression would probably not
arise from dedication of a single public conference to a viewpoint-
based topic; however, suppression might be found in the deletion of a
particular viewpoint from a public conference300 or removal of access
from all public conferences if a single message person did not comport
with the explicitly enunciated viewpoint of a particular conference. 301
Perhaps a First Amendment prohibition would arise upon modifi-
cation of the forum topic. For example, a conference dedicated to
open debate about health care should not be modified by the govern-
ment to debate other topics, such as foreign policy.30 2 Such a meta-
morphosis should be held to violate even the minimal "reasonable in
light of the purposes of the forum" test used for nonpublic forums
297. Id.
298. Id. at 192-93.
299. Id. at 192 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
548 (1983) (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959))).
300. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e
hold that local school boards may not remove books from school library shelves simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."').
301. Cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (striking down
restriction from "editorializing" placed on a grant because the recipient "is not able to
segregate its activities according to the source of its funding").
302. Consider the "Fanny Hill" incident: Disk space was made available on a com-
puter owned by a state university and connected to the Internet. The disk space was made
available in order that people who used the Internet could place "electronic books" with-
out restriction of any sort (other than the disk space) onto the disk for distribution to other
people. Upon a third party's objection to one such book, it was removed from the disk,
and a policy was introduced making all installations subject to the approval of the system
administrator. Such belated and potentially arbitrary modifications to the restrictions on
designated public forums should be understood presumptively to violate the First Amend-
ment. See David L. Wilson, On the Internet, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 1994, at
A25 ("An electronic version of a ribald 18th-century novel has been removed from a com-
puter connected to the Internet, prompting a spirited debate about censoring computerized
material.").
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because the purpose of the forum was (by stipulation) to discuss
health care.303
Although delegation of the moderating function to certain pri-
vate individuals may be prohibited by the First Amendment, 304 the
public forum doctrine is more likely to limit the government's discre-
tion in regulating moderators305 If the facility used to create confer-
ences is itself considered a limited public forum,306 government action
to limit either the topics or the kinds of privately moderated confer-
ences generated within that facility should be subject to the scrutiny
appropriate for limited public forums. For example, the government
should not be allowed to deny a request by Wendy to use such a facil-
ity to create her Politics conference as a video-conference rather than
as a teleconference on the basis that she is of the wrong political
party.3 07 (By contrast, if Wendy's request were made for a nonforum
facility, such as the conference-generating facility operated by the
mayor's office, it should not raise any constitutional problem for the
mayor to deny her request, even based on her political affiliation.)
The licensing of such electronic public forums must not be open
to subjective criteria because the Court has held that unbridled discre-
tion can too easily lead to viewpoint suppression.308 Other less impor-
303. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,2705-06
(1992) (stating reasonableness test); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (per curiam) (affirming appellate court holding that ban on dissemi-
nation of literature in airport terminal as unreasonable); see also discussion supra notes
137-142 (reasonableness test has some bite in forums, as contrasted with non-forums).
304. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,127 (1982) (striking down "unilat-
eral and absolute" delegation to a church of liquor licensing for establishments within 500
feet).
305. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (requiring state university to
allow a student religious group to continue using school meeting facilities); Southeastern
Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-58 (1975) (holding that rejection of application to
use a municipal theater for a production of "Hair" amounted to a prior restraint in viola-
tion of the First Amendment).
306. See supra note 276.
307. More difficult issues might be raised by attempted government regulations of top-
ics in which government has a recognized interest in regulating, such as smoking, sex, or
profanity and obscenity. See e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989)
(affirming lower court ruling on constitutionality of Communications Act as applied to
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
750-51 (1978) (upholding FCC order regulating indecent, but not obscene radio broadcast);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (affirming FCC ruling requiring
radio and TV stations carrying cigarette advertising to present anti-smoking program-
ming), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
308. William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time; Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv.
757, 763 (1986) (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
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tant issues controlling the government's discretion in licensing the
creation of electronic public forums include whether the regulations
are "'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest"'
and "whether they leave open adequate 'alternative channels for com-
munication of the information.' ' 309
Once licensed, the person controlling the forum might be treated
as a state actor. This determination would subject some of her deci-
sions to constitutional scrutiny, especially if the forum were somehow
used as part of a government system 310 and her decisions discrimi-
nated on the basis of race or gender.31'
b. Forum Membership
Some issues about membership in conferences can be clarified by
reference to Professor Berger's enumeration of public forum attrib-
utes. Although the restrictions on membership should control the
classification of the forum, other issues remain. For example, in con-
sidering whether a membership list should be publicly available, one
could draw an analogy to Professor Berger's distinction between a low
expectation of privacy in the marketplace as compared to higher ex-
pectations of privacy within the home.312 Likewise, one might argue
that expectations of privacy are lower in a conference within a public
forum. In a public conference, a person may, for example, have no
constitutional right to be anonymous.313 Likewise, an electronic con-
640, 649 (1981), Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975), and Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)).
309. Lee, supra note 307, at 758 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Professor Lee notes that "measuring the substantiality of
the government's interest is not a critical part of the Court's time, place, and manner meth-
odology. The court rarely tells legislatures or Congress that their concerns are insubstan-
tial; therefore, the balance will usually be struck in favor of governmental interests." Id. at
782-83 (footnote omitted). As for alternative channels of communication, it would be too
speculative, even for this author in the context of this Article, to suggest what alternative
channels of the Information Superhighway would be sufficient to uphold a restriction. See
id. at 801 & n.275.
310. See sources cited supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
311. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding gender-based
peremptory challenges unconstitutional in civil cases); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-28 (1991) (holding race-based peremptory challenges
unconstitutional).
312. Berger, supra note 170, at 653, 655.
313. Note that providing the membership of the forum can be limited to providing
electronic addresses, a step that is not identical to providing identities. Knowing another
person's electronic address can be more useful than knowing his or her name, because then
he or she can be contacted; however, because addresses can be manipulated to obscure the
true identity of the individual contacted, an address without an identity can be useless for
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ference itself, if created with a public conference-generating facility
that is subject to some public forum limitations, may not be kept se-
cret consistent with public forum principles.
As with paper mailing lists, people who no longer want to receive
material should be able to remove themselves from the conference.
At least, a law requiring a removal option should be upheld.3 14
Although this result can be justified without reference to the public
forum, the idea has special weight in the public forum context where
attendance is usually envisioned as voluntary and nonbinding.315
As with changes to topic dedication, a court applying the public
forum doctrine should view changes in membership restrictions of an
electronic public forum suspiciously. Changes that convert an elec-
tronic designated public forum into a nonpublic forum should fail
even the lowest scrutiny-requiring a regulation be "reasonable in
light of the purposes of the forum" 316-because converting a public
forum into a nonpublic forum, without more, is directly contrary to
the original purposes of the forum.
c. Forum Costs
The issues relating to the appropriateness of costs for the use of
traditional public forums have been comprehensively set forth by
commentators.31 7 Professor Goldberger has summarized the Supreme
Court cases in a simple proposition: "[T]he state may recoup the ac-
tual costs of governmental services that are generated by the use of
public property for speech activities, as long as the charge is not so
great as to appear to the judiciary to be oppressive or completely
preclusive of speech. '318
other purposes. Such concerns are not merely hypothetical. See Eben Shapiro, Tobacco
Firm Seeks Antismoking Network's Records, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1994, at B1 ("Lawyers
for the American Tobacco Co. file subpoena for access to membership list of a computer
network used by Advocacy Institute, an antismoking group ... .") (abstract).
For further discussion of identification requirement provisions in the non-electronic
context, see sources cited supra note 38.
314. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (up-
holding law which provided that addressees who received in the mail "a pandering adver-
tisement" they deemed offensive could obtain the removal of their names from the
advertiser's mailing list and stop all future mailings; "a mailer's right to communicate must
stop at the mail box of an unreceptive addressee").
315. Berger, supra note 170, at 655 (describing free entry and movement as an intrinsic
element of a marketplace).
316. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-66
(1992).
317. See Neisser, supra note 259; Goldberger, supra note 162.
318. Goldberger, supra note 162, at 409-10.
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There will be many costs associated with electronic forums, in-
cluding the costs of transmitting the messages from senders, managing
the messages, storing messages, and forwarding messages to recipi-
ents. The state is permitted to recoup its costs for these activities
through user fees, like the price of postage for mail,319 licensing and
application fees,320 and facility rental fees.321
Although traditional public forums are not usually subject to such
user fees, the Court has held that arenas with user fees can, nonethe-
less, be limited public forums.322 If government-controlled electronic
forums were classified as limited public forums, it would be permissi-
ble to charge user fees for messages sent, similar to postal fees for
paper mail, and messages received, similar to admission charges at
theaters.323
However, in privately controlled public forums,324 the inherent
flexibility of the electronic medium means that choices in defining the
functionality of the forum can profoundly affect the allocation of costs
among the various parties to the forum.325 For example, a forum that
automatically forwards every message sent to it could reasonably be
structured to impose the forwarding costs on the message senders.
The message senders would be in the best position to evaluate
whether it was worth sending the message by considering how many
people receive messages sent to the conference. On the other hand, a
forum that archives messages for open perusal might naturally impose
the costs of transmitting those messages on the recipients because
they could regulate the number of messages they wish to receive. By
imposing costs on either the sender or the recipient, a government
319. See Neisser, supra note 259, at 329-30.
320. Id. at 347-49 ("Application and license fees are the only charges that courts rou-
tinely have approved, even after the development of modern first amendment
jurisprudence.").
321. Id. at 344-47 ("Rental charges for public auditoriums and pavilions are classic user
fees, and are almost certainly consistent with the first amendment.").
322. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1981) (university facilities); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (fairgrounds);
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552 (1975) (theater).
323. Cf. Berger, supra note 170, at 655 (noting that the idealized public market has "no
entry fee, dress code, or identification requirement"); Anthony J. Rose, Note, The Beggar's
Free Speech Claim, 65 IND. L.J. 191, 228 (1989) (concluding that begging in the public
forum "deserves the greatest judicial protection.").
324. See supra notes 275-280 and accompanying text.
325. See Neisser, supra note 259, at 338-39, 342-43 (suggesting an attention to less re-
strictive alternatives in order to minimize police service fees and safety and health equip-
ment fees).
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provider may be ignoring alternatives that are less burdensome upon
the purses of those using the electronic public forum.
Criminal or civil liability may also be imposed upon people who
send messages or those who control the conferences.3 26 Professor
Neisser has noted that liability for the negligent acts of forum partici-
pants is "a perfectly logical-sounding candidate for required insur-
ance, by analogy to mandatory driver's insurance. '327  The
constitutionally permissible scope of required insurance for message
liability will depend on the now-uncertain scope of that liability. A
requirement of inordinately expensive insurance imposed on either
those who use or those who control public forums on the NII could
impermissibly conflict with public forum principles.
d. Forum Closure
The issue of forum closure is critical for governmental operation
of electronic public forums. For example, a government may no
longer be interested in subsidizing an unmoderated debate on health
care. Although this Article has suggested that the government should
not be permitted to convert a public forum into a nonpublic one,
328
there should be no question that the government may close the fo-
rum.32 9 As the Court noted in Perry, "Although a State is not re-
quired to indefinitely retain the open character of the [designated
326. See, eg., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Introduction, Symposium The Congress, the Courts
and Computer Based Communications Networks: Answering Questions About Access and
Content Control, 38 Vm... L. REv. 319, 325-33 (1993); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability,
the First Amendmen4 and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, HAv. J.L. & TEcH,
Spring 1992, at 65. But see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (no liability for a computer network for defamatory information in its conference).
327. Neisser, supra note 259, at 305. But Neisser notes that "it is extremely unclear
what liability municipalities fear," and concludes that "[i]t is most questionable, therefore,
whether any requirement for insurance or indemnification of municipal liability is ration-
ally justified." Id. at 307. He also notes that "insurance concepts ... collide with first
amendment principles." Id. at 308. For example, "[m]andatory liability insurance for spe-
cial events ... creates a regulatory distinction based precisely on a particular form of
constitutionally protected activity-public association-typical of those with dissident per-
spectives. It therefore must fall as a most insidious and unusual form of content discrimi-
nation." Id. at 311.
328. See discussion supra Section III(C)(2)(a).
329. Cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding decision of a city council
to close its public swimming pools rather than desegregate them). But cf Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,872 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that "local school boards may
not remove books from the school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas
contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion"'); Griffin v. School Bd., 377
U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (disallowing school closure intended to avoid desegregation).
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non-traditional public forum] facility, as long as it does so it is bound
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum." 330
Thus, if the State wishes to create an electronic nonpublic forum with
an active membership, it should find some other means than creating
an electronic public forum with lively discussion and then modifying
the forum to be nonpublic.
Conclusion
The NII will soon be with us. It will be a complicated place.
Although the First Amendment can play an important role in the NII
by protecting free speech and in separating the private sphere from
the public, existing constitutional doctrines cannot necessarily be
mechanically transported.
This Article has attempted to sketch thoughtful ways in which the
public forum doctrine might be applied within the NII. Even with the
assumptions this Article made, analysis of simple hypothetical cases
became quite complicated. Consequently, this Article concludes that
the public forum doctrine can have continued vitality within the NII,
but only if it is applied in a nuanced fashion.
This Article has argued that some landmarks on the Information
Superhighway should have constitutional significance and has sug-
gested particular landmarks with constitutional significance: govern-
ment-owned or government-controlled forums that are operated on a
nonprofit basis and have unrestricted access to message recipients and
viewpoint-neutral access to a reasonably large number of message
senders. This Article has also discussed the possible constitutional rel-
evance of those landmarks by focusing on four sets of issues that will
surely be raised: topic dedication, forum membership, forum costs,
and forum closure.
Actual cases not yet imagined will surely provide more thorns.
Bewildered by both high technology and complex hypotheticals, one
might feel limited by context and be tempted to try to avoid the sub-
ject altogether. But as Professor Seidman stated, "[W]e must either
act or fail to act, and either course requires justification. So in order
to live our lives, there is no escape from telling ourselves that we are
able to transcend context so as to make decisions about the kind of
future we want to have."'331 Perhaps this Article will provide a help-
ful, if rough, traveler's aid in that process.
330. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
331. Seidman, supra note 16, at 1058-59.
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